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Abstract 
The recent crisis has raised two key macroeconomic issues. First, has the quantitative easing policy 
pursued by the Federal Reserve had an effect on output, employment and prices? Second, whether 
‘quantitative easing,’ is a mechanism through which monetary policy may continue to be able to 
stimulate economic activity despite the presence of the zero lower bound and various financial market 
frictions. This paper surveys the recent empirical evidence of the policy having a substantial impact 
on various interest rates in the United States because of certain financial frictions. It then uses this 
evidence to analyse the macroeconomic effects of the quantitative easing policy by simulating a New 
Keynesian macroeconomic model shown to closely fit the U.S. economy. It is concluded that the 
quantitative easing policy has had an impact on output, prices and employment, irrespective of any 
plausible financial frictions arising from the GFC. The result also demonstrates that the policy could 
be used as a monetary policy instrument. The paper ends with an examination of the numerous 
avenues of research that must be pursued before a firm conclusion can be made regarding the use of 
quantitative easing as a viable instrument of monetary policy.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Great Financial Crisis (GFC) is considered the largest macroeconomic crisis since the Great 
Depression (Stiglitz, 2010; Reinhart and Rogoff, 2008). Following excessive risk taking by global 
financial markets and the subsequent meltdown in the American sub-prime mortgage market, world 
financial markets became paralysed by a wave of uncertainty (Astley et al., 2009; Covitz et al., 2009). 
The collapses of Lehman Brothers and AIG further shook confidence in the integrity of the world’s 
financial system, leading to substantial increases in interest rate spreads during the period (Taylor, 
2009; Mishkin, 2011). The flow-on effects of these financial difficulties were soon felt in the wider 
economy, resulting in severe decreases in international trade and economic growth not seen since the 
Great Depression (Astley et al., 2009). Governments felt obliged to act to ensure financial stability in 
the short term, at the very least, but then to reduce unemployment and increase growth in the longer 
term.  
Central banks also came under pressure to respond to the financial paralysis and economic woes. At 
first they responded with the very conventional policy response of cutting their target interest rates. 
This was an attempt at reducing the level of interest rates across the maturity spectrum, thereby 
encouraging borrowing, investment and spending (Taylor, 2009). As the crisis worsened, a key 
question that arose was whether monetary policy could remain effective even in the worst possible 
scenario for policymakers of unsustainable levels of government debt, persistent and abnormally high 
yield spreads, a zero nominal policy rate and deflation.1  
A variety of answers to this question had already been proposed after Japan’s deflationary period, 
including zero interest rate commitments, quantitative easing and asset buyback programs (Bernanke 
and Reinhart, 2004). Only quantitative easing was the most vigorously pursued and so forms the focus 
of this thesis.2  
                                                            
1 Unsustainable government debt is defined as a debt to GDP ratio that cannot be maintained at trend growth rates without politically 
unfeasible tax increases or spending cuts (Domar, 1944). 
2 A zero interest rate commitment occurs when the central bank states that it will not raise the target nominal interest rate until certain 
conditions are satisfied. Examples include the zero interest rate policy commitment of the Bank of Japan (ZIRP) between 1999-2005 
(Eggertsson and Woodford, 2003; Okina and Shiratsuka, 2004) and the recent commitment by the Federal Reserve (Federal Reserve, 
2011d). 
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Quantitative easing (hereafter ‘QE’) is a monetary policy instrument defined as a ‘package of 
unconventional policy measures designed to absorb the shocks hitting the economy by making use of 
both the asset and liability sides of the central bank balance sheet’ (Shiratsuka, 2009). It absorbs 
shocks by reducing long-term interest rates and stresses within the financial system brought on by 
financial crises. It is argued that QE reduces interest rates through three core channels: altering private 
sector expectations about the future course of monetary policy, reducing the total supply of long-term 
securities, which increases prices and lowers yields, and reducing illiquidity concerns by providing a 
consistent buyer of long-term securities (Chung et al., 2011). It also reduces stress by providing 
sufficient liquidity to embattled financial institutions and the central bank acting as a market maker in 
certain paralysed asset markets. By doing so, the central bank aims to facilitate the expansion of credit 
and investment, thereby assisting the economic recovery.  
Before the current crisis, the most significant implementation of QE was by the Bank of Japan 
between 2001 and 2006. In an attempt to combat persistent deflation, falling output and financial 
instability, the Bank of Japan augmented its traditional operating procedure by injecting significant 
amounts of central bank reserves, through the purchase of government securities, to achieve certain 
targets for current account balances. The Bank of Japan also allowed a wider range of entities to 
borrow at the official target rate and committed to maintaining sufficient liquidity if required (Kimura 
et al., 2003). 
The Federal Reserve and the Bank of England have also recently aggressively pursued variants of this 
policy. After reducing its target interest rate to 0.5% in March 2009, the Bank of England began 
purchasing two hundred billion pounds worth of (almost entirely government) securities of varying 
maturities through the issuing of reserves (Joyce et al., 2010). The purchases amount to approximately 
14% of nominal GDP (Figure 1). In conjunction with other short-term liquidity provision programs,3 
the Federal Reserve has also implemented QE by purchasing of $1.25 trillion dollars worth of 
mortgage-backed securities (hereafter ‘MBS’) and $600 billion of treasury securities as well as the 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
 
3 Examples include the Term Auction Facility and the Term Securities Lending Facility. 
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use of short-term liquidity provision services to certain stressed securities markets (Figure 2) 
(Mishkin, 2011).  
Figure 1 
 
Source: Joyce et al. (2010) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
9 
 
Figure 2 
 
 
Source: Curdia and Woodford (2011) 
 
Recent empirical evidence indicates that these two policies reduced a variety of interest rates by 50-
100 basis points (Gagnon et al., 2011; Joyce et al., 2011). However, little is known about their 
macroeconomic effects especially given the difficulties in financial markets. This thesis examines a 
version of the postulated transmission mechanism for QE to uncover the full range of its potential 
macroeconomic effects, both theoretically and in relation to the Federal Reserve’s policy. It is found 
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that QE has improved economic welfare by stimulating aggregate demand. A further conclusion is 
that QE appears to be a valid instrument for monetary policy to remain effective even in very difficult 
economic conditions.  
The rest of this thesis is structured as follows. Section 2 provides an evaluation of the empirical 
evidence and the theoretical models used to ascertain QE’s effect on key macroeconomic variables. 
Section 3 presents a transmission mechanism for how QE could stimulate output and prices. Section 4 
sets out the model that will be used to investigate QE’s effects. Section 5 presents the results from 
simulations of this model. Section 6 contains a discussion of the implications of these results for the 
future conduct of monetary policy and section 7 concludes.  
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW  
Three key strands of the overwhelmingly large literature examining alternative instruments for 
monetary policy are relevant to the questions raised in this thesis: the theoretical justifications for QE, 
the empirical evidence of QE’s effectiveness when implemented and the different models that have 
been used to analyse unconventional monetary policy.  
2.1. Theoretical Justifications for QE  
It is well-established that under normal circumstances the monetary authority’s primary instrument for 
achieving their objective(s) is a short-term interest rate (Mishkin, 2007). However, as demonstrated 
during the Great Depression, the Japanese experience between 1990-2006 and the current crisis, this 
methodology can become problematic due to the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates. Blinder 
(2000) identifies seven alternatives ranging from purchasing government securities with a longer 
maturity to purchasing foreign securities to depreciate the exchange rate. Bernanke and Reinhart 
(2004) and Klyuev et al. (2009) narrow these to the two most plausible ‘unconventional’ techniques: 
actions which shape expectations of future interest rates and expanding the size or altering the 
composition of the central bank’s balance sheet (QE).  These techniques are not mutually exclusive. 
As seen in the Federal Reserve’s policy, the expansion of its balance sheet may be an action taken to 
credibly signal future policy actions.  
 
Auerbach and Obstfeld (2005) demonstrate that if QE involves a credible commitment to raise the 
money supply permanently, then inflation expectations rise, lowering the real interest rate and hence 
stimulating aggregate demand. After incorporating a financial sector, they also identify that banks’ 
beliefs regarding the permanency of the monetary base expansion determines QE’s effectiveness. 
Their crucial insight is that QE’s effectiveness is primarily determined by how temporary private 
sector participants expect the policy to be.4 This result demonstrates that, theoretically, QE can enable 
the monetary authorities to stimulate economic activity even after the zero lower bound is reached.  
                                                            
4 A temporary policy refers to the situation where the monetary authority injects large amounts of high-powered money through the purchase 
of securities before completely reversing the injection. This is in contrast to a permanent increase which entails an injection leading to a 
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Nevertheless, each time QE has been used, it has been perceived or explicitly stated to be temporary, 
raising a key theoretical problem. There appears little consensus in the literature regarding whether 
this problem precludes QE from being effective. Bernanke, Reinhart and Sack (2004) extensively 
discuss the ways in which a temporary version of QE could work in a ‘liquidity trap’5 and make two 
significant contributions. First, they emphasise that in order for the monetary authorities to shape 
interest rate expectations by policy commitments, their statements must be credible. One method of 
sending a credible signal is to undertake actions such as temporarily increasing the size of the central 
bank’s balance (Krugman, 2000). In contrast to a pure policy commitment, which suffers from a time 
inconsistency and so a credibility problem (Kydland and Prescott, 1977; Barro and Gordon, 1983), 
such an action is credible because of the risk involved in these asset purchases and the delay before 
the central bank’s position could be reversed. Second, they demonstrate that QE may have a direct 
impact on interest rates through imperfections in financial markets. This motivates part of the analysis 
in section 4.  
In contrast to Bernanke, Reinhart and Sack (2004), Eggertsson and Woodford (2003, 2004) conclude 
that upon reaching the lower bound on the nominal interest rate, any increase in the monetary base 
which does not signal a future change in interest rate policy will ‘neither stimulate real activity or halt 
deflation.’ The reason is twofold. Forward looking agents will anticipate the reversal of the policy, as 
occurred for Japan between 2001-2006, and will therefore adjust their economic decisions 
accordingly. Moreover, at the zero lower bound, bonds and the monetary base become substitutes so 
agents will respond to asset purchases by increasing their holdings of money. This implies that the 
model’s general equilibrium is independent of the supply of bonds and money at the zero lower 
bound. Another crucial observation is that the financial imperfections required to generate any 
portfolio rebalancing effect may in fact generate countervailing effects. Theoretically, the stimulatory 
influence of the portfolio rebalancing effect is therefore ambiguous. Unfortunately, their illustrative 
model only contains a representative consumer and no financial frictions and none of these plausible 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
temporary increase in the growth of the money supply but allowing ‘base drift’ after that. The money supply is not returned back to the level 
it would have been without the injection of funds. 
5 This is defined as a period of deflation when the nominal interest rate is at zero such that money and short-term bonds become perfect 
substitutes (Krugman et al., 1998) 
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countervailing effects. This limits the validity of their conclusions regarding the portfolio rebalancing 
channel and is the impetus for this thesis to examine this issue in section 4.   
Even after incorporating financial market frictions, it still remains theoretically unclear whether QE 
would have an unambiguously positive influence on economic activity. Curdia and Woodford (2011) 
incorporate borrowing frictions and heterogeneous households and demonstrate that a temporary use 
of QE will only stimulate aggregate demand if it enables the central bank to extend the optimal level 
of credit to the private sector. This conclusion is also reached by Gertler and Karadi (2011) using a 
slightly modified framework which incorporates financial intermediaries. Importantly, Curdia and 
Woodford (2011) find that the provision of reserves beyond this optimal level of credit does not alter 
the path of the endogenous variables in equilibrium and so QE cannot have any effect. Such an 
irrelevance proposition was also found in the context of bank lending (Martin et al., 2011). However, 
they abstract from non-financial firms and capital accumulation which is not desirable given that one 
of the main objectives of QE is to stimulate investment by lowering long-term interest rates. Another 
limitation is that no firm micro-foundations are provided for the credit spread which should be derived 
from profit maximisation by financial intermediaries’ under imperfect information (Bernanke et al., 
1999).  
It is apparent that the theoretical effects of QE depend on both the degree of financial imperfections 
and whether it signals a change in the future course of the policy rate. Heterogeneity in households, 
lending constraints on banks, preferred habitats for financial market participants and borrowing 
constraints for households and firms may all enable a temporary use of QE to stimulate demand, 
primarily by altering inflation or interest rate expectations (Clouse et al., 2003). It is therefore 
important to survey empirical evidence on whether such frictions exist to a sufficient extent that QE 
has been effective when implemented.  
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2.2. Empirical Analyses of QE’s Effectiveness 
The empirical literature analysing the policy’s effectiveness, including the relative importance of the 
identified financial market imperfections through which it can operate, can be separated into those 
examining the Japanese experience between 2001-2006 or the current implementation in the US, UK 
and Japan. 
2.2.1. Japan’s Experience between 2001-2006 
Ugai (2006) provides an excellent summary of numerous articles examining the relative strengths of 
the various transmission mechanism channels for the Japanese episode. Considerable variation in 
results amongst the papers is found. Nevertheless, the overall conclusion is that QE had moderate 
effects on interest rates and other asset yields through the portfolio rebalancing effect and by 
providing credibility to the monetary authority’s low interest rate commitment.  
Upon re-examining the period, Shiratsuka (2009) also concludes that the policy had an effect on 
short-term interest rates (e.g. the Tokyo interbank offered rates) and credit spreads. Another finding is 
that QE helped stabilise the financial system by providing financial institutions with sufficient 
liquidity while they repaired their balance sheets. This is supported by Oda and Ueda (2005) using a 
small macroeconomic model with no-arbitrage asset pricing components. These authors find that the 
policy had small effects on interest rates and mainly acted to provide credibility to the Bank of 
Japan’s zero interest rate policy (ZIRP). However, Oda and Ueda (2005) also conclude that the policy 
had uncertain effects on the risk premium in long-term bond yields. The paper’s methodology does 
have the drawback that they abstract from many potentially confounding effects in their model, 
casting doubt on their conclusions. An example is failing to control for binding liquidity constraints 
on firms.  
A key issue that remains, despite this strong evidence regarding interest rates, is that after considering 
evidence from a variety of statistical methods, Ugai (2006) finds contradictory estimates of QE’s 
effect on economic activity. The reason for this appears to be the choice of econometric methodology. 
Those studies which utilise sign-restricted vector auto-regressions find QE had small but significant 
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effects (Kamada and Sugo, 2006; Schenkelberg and Watzka, 2011) while those using alternative 
methodologies do not (Okina and Shiratsuka, 2004; Baba, Nishioka, Oda, Shirakawa, Ueda and Ugai, 
2005). This reinforces the need to use a macroeconomic model to ascertain the effects of QE.  
Despite these contradictory results, these papers provide the necessary empirical evidence to justify 
incorporating further financial frictions within a fully specified macroeconomic model. They also 
identify the important factors behind why QE has a definite effect interest rates but an uncertain effect 
on output and inflation. Kamada and Sugo (2006) conclude that this is due to (1) a significant 
deterioration in private sector balance sheets due to asset price declines and (2) large disruptions to 
traditional economic relationships (financial and non-financial), once the zero lower bound is reached, 
which severely impedes economic activity. Support for these conclusions is found in the estimated 
debt overhang of firms and households by Shirakawa (2001) and the finding by Fujiwara (2006) that 
there was a structural break in both the Japanese economy and monetary policy’s effectiveness in the 
1990s. The insights of these papers will be used to motivate some aspects of the model presented in 
section 4.  
2.2.2. Current Experience of Quantitative Easing 
In an analysis of QE by the Bank of England, Meier (2009) and Joyce et al. (2010) find that the large 
scale purchase of gilts (government bonds) led to a decline in yields immediately following the policy 
announcement of between 40-100 and 55-120 basis points respectively over the 5-25 year segment of 
the yield curve. Joyce et al. (2010) also identify significant movements in corporate bond yields but 
uncertain effects of the policy on equity prices and the sterling exchange rate. While providing further 
evidence of QE’s effects on interest rates, the use of a one to three day timeframe is clearly inadequate 
for assessing the policy’s macroeconomic effects.  
Gagnon et al. (2010) use a similar empirical methodology to Joyce et al. (2010) to identify the effect 
of the Federal Reserve’s policy on yields across the maturity spectrum. They conclude that the yields 
on the assets targeted by the policy fell cumulatively by 120 basis points on average, after all the 
relevant policy announcements occurred. The authors also find that the component of QE that 
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involved bond purchases lowered the term premium on government bonds by 52 basis points. These 
findings are supported by Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011) who use an event study 
approach to identify sharp decreases in nominal rates for long-term safe assets and a rise in inflation 
expectations, implying an even larger drop in real interest rates. Lenza et al. (2010) corroborates these 
findings using a Bayesian VAR to estimate the policy’s effects on yields and spreads over many 
different asset classes. Furthermore, when specifically focussing on the MBS purchases, Hancock and 
Passmore (2010) conclude that the asset purchases removed risk premiums due to the financial crisis 
from mortgage rates primarily through providing greater market liquidity.  
Using a wide array of methodologies, the empirical literature demonstrates that QE does indeed have 
an effect on financial market conditions and interest rates. This establishes that sufficient financial 
market frictions exist for QE to stimulate economic activity, though there is little consensus regarding 
the size and direction of this effect. As a result, a macroeconomic model which replicates the United 
States economy very well and is capable of being augmented to capture the essence of QE is required 
for this thesis to achieve its aims.  
2.3. Modelling Unconventional Monetary Policy  
The seminal paper on modelling unconventional monetary policy actions is Eggertsson and Woodford 
(2003). The authors use a somewhat standard New Keynesian framework in their analysis with the 
main elements including a representative household, monopolistic competition in the goods market, 
price adjustment as in Calvo (1983) and non-separable real money balances in the utility function.6 In 
terms of conditions it is assumed that:7 
 
ܷᇱ௠ ሺܥ௧ ,
ܯ௧
௧ܲ
,  ߦ௧ ሻ ൐ 0 ݂݋ݎ ݈݈ܽ 
ܯ௧
௧ܲ
൑ ݉ሺ ௧ܻ;  ߦ௧ ሻ 
 
                                                            
6 Non-separable money balances implies that the marginal utility of consumption does not depend on money balances (Gali, 2008). To 
illustrate the point, a non-separable utility function would be of the form ܷሺܥ௧ , ெ೟௉೟ ,  ௧ܰ ሻ ൌ  
ቆሺଵିణሻ஼೟భషೡା ణಾ೟ು೟
భషೡቇ
భష഑
భషೡ
ଵିఙ െ  
 ே೟ భశക
ଵାఝ  whereas a 
separable utility function would be of the form ܷሺܥ௧ , ெ೟௉೟ ,  ௧ܰ ሻ ൌ  
஼೟భష഑
ଵିఙ ൅   
ಾ೟
ು೟
భషೡ
ଵି௩ െ  
 ே೟ భశക
ଵାఝ  (Gali, 2008). 
7 ܥ௧ denotes the level of consumption, ெ೟௉೟  is the level of real money balances held by households and  ߦ௧  is a vector of exogenous 
disturbances (e.g. external finance premium or net worth shocks) (Eggertsson and Woodford, 2003). The satiation level of real money 
balances at different income levels is given by ݉ሺ ௧ܻ;  ߦ௧ ሻ. 
(2.1)
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ܷᇱ௠ ሺܥ௧ ,
ܯ௧
௧ܲ
,  ߦ௧ ሻ ൌ 0 ݂݋ݎ ݈݈ܽ 
ܯ௧
௧ܲ
൐ ݉ሺ ௧ܻ;  ߦ௧ ሻ 
Household optimisation yields the following two inequalities with the ‘complementary slackness’ 
condition that at least one must hold with equality at any time (Eggertsson and Woodford, 2003).8 
 
ܯ௧
௧ܲ
൒ ܮሺ ௧ܻ, ݅௧;  ߦ௧ ሻ 
 
݅௧ ൒ 0 
 
This implies that once the satiation level ൫݉ሺ ௧ܻ;  ߦ௧ ሻ൯ is reached,9 the nominal interest rate must be 
zero and so the equilibrium becomes independent of the actual monetary base level so long as it 
exceeds the amount required for the satiation level to bind. In their model, QE is represented by a 
choice of monetary base function where the central bank supplies excess liquidity over that which is 
required to maintain the nominal interest rate at zero. The authors therefore conclude that unless the 
policy alters expectations of future policy rates (and hence interest rates using the expectations 
approach) then it will have no effect on consumption, investment and output. However, this 
conclusion relies on the underlying assumption that households have a satiation level for real money 
balances. 
Despite Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) clearly identifying the main conditions for the Japanese QE 
policy to theoretically succeed, their model cannot be used for three reasons. First, the specification of 
the monetary base rule does not accord with the current policy reality. The current policy is not 
targeting the size of outside money but instead involves purchasing set quantities of assets to 
influence yields across the yield curve. Second, Doh (2010) suggests that the lack of financial 
imperfections, such as investors having preferred habitats and credit rationing, is the reason behind 
the communication channel being the only channel available in the model. Given the empirical 
evidence on these imperfections, a failure to include them would severely limit the analysis. Third, 
even if the policy altered financial market perceptions of future interest rates this would not lead to an 
                                                            
8 ܮሺ ௧ܻ, ݅௧;  ߦ௧ ሻ is the money demand function arising from the households’ optimisation problem with real money balances in the utility 
function. The nominal interest rate is denoted by ݅௧. 
9 The satiation level is defined as the minimum level of money balances at which the marginal utility from holding real money balances is 
zero such that the nominal interest rate also equals zero. 
(2.2)
(2.3)
(2.4)
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unambiguous negative and positive change in interest rates and output respectively. Relationships 
within financial markets and between financial markets and the real economy may have been severely 
disrupted (Kamada and Sugo, 2006) and such factors must also be accounted for.  
Much attention has been given to financial market and other frictions within the context of a New 
Keynesian model. Smets and Wouters (2007) construct a more sophisticated model than Eggertsson 
and Woodford (2003) including adjustment lags and costs, investment specific technology shocks, 
wage shocks and price shocks. An excellent feature of this paper is that the authors establish the 
validity of these additions by showing how their model achieves a tighter fit with the actual data 
compared to unrestricted VAR models.  
Nevertheless, the empirical evidence suggests that it would be better to employ a model with many 
more frictions to ascertain QE’s effects. For example, Smets and Wouters (2007) do not explicitly 
model one key financial market imperfection which has been identified as another channel through 
which monetary policy can function (the credit channel) (Mishkin, 2007). Bernanke et al. (1999) label 
this imperfection the ‘financial accelerator’ which describes the increase in the external finance 
premium as the ratio of borrowings to borrowers’ net worth rises due to higher moral hazard and 
adverse selection problems. While this mechanism is included in Smets and Wouters (2007) as a 
shock disturbance, Bernanke et al. (1999) provide insights into the microeconomic foundations and 
macroeconomic implications of this mechanism. In order to achieve the most complete analysis 
possible, it is therefore necessary to incorporate these insights into the Smets and Wouters (2007) 
model.  
Gilchrist et al. (2009) extend the Smets and Wouters (2007) model by explicitly incorporating the 
external finance premium equation of Bernanke et al. (1999). An alternative framework is Iacoviello 
(2005) who extends Bernanke et al. (1999) by including real estate which is used by consumers and 
firms as collateral for loans and for production respectively. Given the importance of housing in both 
the debt-fuelled consumption increases between 2004-2007 and the GFC, this model would appear to 
be tailor-made to the questions under consideration. However, the model only contains a technology 
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shock, a housing preference shock and an inflation shock, none of which provide a plausible 
description of the crisis which QE was instituted to counteract. For example, no analysis of the crisis 
is known which suggests that the sudden decrease in housing prices and the resulting economic 
turmoil was due to a shock to consumers’ preferences regarding housing. Instead, a more reasonable 
proposition is the sub-prime mortgage collapse induced falls in all asset prices, including house 
prices. In turn, this caused a sharp decrease in entrepreneurs’ net worth and an increase in uncertainty 
and risk aversion and hence yield spreads (Blanchard, 2010). The Gilchrist et al. (2009) model 
contains one of the broadest set of dynamics in the literature including shocks to net worth and yield 
spreads and matches the actual data well (Pagan and Robinson, 2011). As such, this model is more 
capable of replicating the path of the U.S. economy with and without QE. It therefore represents the 
best starting point for any theoretical analysis of the policy.  
It appears that while the transmission mechanism for QE has been extensively discussed there has not 
been sufficient research which convincingly identifies empirically the long-term effects of the policy 
on key macroeconomic variables or embeds components of the suggested transmission mechanism 
into an augmented New Keynesian DSGE model to investigate its effects. While addressing both 
would be desirable, this thesis will only focus on the second issue by augmenting an existing model to 
include many other factors which have been identified as crucial to the policy’s success.  
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III. TRANSMISSION MECHANISM FOR QUANTITATIVE EASING 
Before proceeding to an analysis of how QE could affect output and prices it is first important to set 
out the underlying theoretical framework upon which the transmission mechanism for QE is based. 
Monetary policy has come to be viewed as the pre-eminent instrument for (1) counter-cyclical 
demand management to achieve stable inflation and (2) ensuring financial system stability in 
countries without self-regulation or prudential supervision. This in large part was due to fiscal policy 
being discredited following the high inflation levels of the 1970s and the realisation that the monetary 
policy stance could be varied much more quickly and easily (Mishkin, 1995; Pringle, 1995). While 
monetary base targeting was experimented with, it was quickly abandoned because of concerns about 
its impact on the stability of financial markets and interest rates as well as the stability of the money 
demand relation.  The current consensus is that central banks should use one instrument, a short-term 
interest rate, to achieve their objective(s), typically low inflation (Goodhart, 1987; Lewis and Mizen, 
2000: 339). 
3.1. Traditional transmission mechanism for monetary policy 
A central bank is able to achieve its goals due to the existence of various channels through which an 
alteration to the policy rate, by open market operations, affects the ultimate output and inflation 
variables. These channels have been grouped into three categories: the interest rate channel, the 
exchange rate channel and the credit channel (Mishkin, 1995).  
The interest rate channel is the process whereby a lower policy rate induces a fall in yields across the 
yield curve through arbitrage in financial markets and competition in the banking sector. As a result, 
borrowing costs fall10 and any liquidity/solvency constraints become less stringent, leading to a rise in 
consumption and investment. Investment also rises due to higher expected future demand and lower 
expected future borrowing costs (Lucas and Prescott, 1971; Bernanke, 1983). Furthermore, arbitrage 
between debt and equity markets implies that the lower yields on debt induce a rise in equity prices. 
                                                            
10 If the policy was to lower yields in debt markets through the described mechanism then the funding costs for firms would be reduced 
directly if they had access to those markets. If not, then the lower yields would lower the opportunity cost of borrowing funds for financial 
intermediaries, set at the risk-free rate Rf due to portfolio diversification (Bernanke et al., 1999), resulting in lower borrowing costs for 
borrowers in a competitive financial sector. At the individual firm level, the policy should therefore stimulate investment, ceteris paribus. 
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This raises output further by inducing higher consumption through wealth effects (Dvornak and 
Kohler, 2003) and higher investment by placing upward pressure on Tobin’s Q (Tobin, 1969).  
The exchange rate channel relates to return-maximising investors moving capital to other countries in 
response to the lower returns offered in the domestic country following a fall in the policy rate. This 
causes an increase in the supply of domestic currency in the foreign exchange market and so a 
currency depreciation. A lower nominal currency implies a fall in the real exchange rate under sticky 
prices and the purchasing power parity doctrine (Balassa, 1964). The economy’s international 
competitiveness will rise as a result, leading to higher output. 
The credit channel comprises two parts due to the different effects of an interest rate change on the 
suppliers and purchasers of credit. On the supply side, lower rates imply that banks face lower 
funding costs, increasing the amount of capital available for them to lend (bank lending effect). 
Borrowers also have a higher net worth which reduces the adverse selection/moral hazard issues 
inherent in a debt relationship (balance sheet effect) (Mishkin, 1995). Both effects increase the 
willingness of lenders to provide credit which stimulates investment and consumption (Bordon and 
Weber, 2010). From the borrowers’ perspective, higher net worth lowers consumers and firms’ 
perceptions about the possibility of financial distress which causes them to decrease their level of 
precautionary saving and increase consumer durable, housing and business investment (Mishkin, 
2007: 61). 
3.2. Transmission mechanism for Quantitative Easing 
There exists a significant literature on how variations in the size and composition of the central bank’s 
balance sheet may affect investment, consumption or net exports and therefore activity levels. This 
transmission mechanism is located within the traditional mechanism for monetary policy because QE 
is viewed as an additional instrument for changing certain interest rates when the policy instrument 
faces the zero lower bound constraint. This section consists of Figure 3 which schematically 
represents the transmission mechanism followed by a brief statement of each identified channel. 
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Figure 3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Lower nominal interest rates 
Currency 
Depreciation 
Lending & 
Investment
Net Exports 
Higher Prices, Output and Employment
Future Course of the Official 
Target Rate 
Risk Premia 
Repair of 
Private Sector 
Balance Sheets 
(Consumer, 
Firms & Banks) 
Purchase of Financial Assets using the creation of central bank reserves 
Credible 
commitment 
regarding 
policy rate 
Information regarding 
future 
macroeconomic/financial 
market variables 
Lower 
liquidity 
premia
Lower 
default 
risk 
premia 
Portfolio 
Rebalancing 
by private 
investors 
Inflation Expectations 
Consumption 
Expectations of an 
Economic Recovery 
Lower real interest rates 
Reduced Credit 
Rationing 
Opportunity for 
additional fiscal 
stimulus
Lower 
duration 
premia
Strong Effect 
Weak Effect 
Source: Ugai (2006); Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011) 
External 
Finance 
Premium
23 
 
3.2.1. Long-Term Interest Rates 
A widely accepted approach to the determination of long-term nominal interest rates is that they are 
determined by the expected value of the risk-free rate (typically the policy rate) over the period before 
maturity and a variety of risk premia (Clouse et al., 2003; Blinder, 2010). To fix ideas, one tractable 
way of representing this is:11 
 
݅௧௅ ൌ  ሺ1/ܰሻ ෍ ܧ௧ሺ݅௧ା௦ሻ ൅  ߠ௧௅
ேିଵ
௦ୀ଴
 
 
This component of QE’s transmission mechanism can be clearly understood using these two elements.  
3.2.1.1. Future Course of the Policy Rate 
It has been established that under perfect financial markets, unless the policy altered perceptions 
regarding the future course of interest rates, then it will have no effect (Eggertsson and Woodford, 
2003). The policy could achieve this by using the large-scale purchase of financial assets to provide 
the necessary credibility to a commitment to maintain interest rates at very low levels for an extended 
period of time (Clouse et al., 2003). Credibility would be obtained because the Federal Reserve would 
incur substantial losses if it raised interest rates before removing the excess liquidity by selling the 
acquired assets.12 The sheer scale of the asset purchases also signals the Federal Reserve’s resolve in 
their policy actions (Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen, 2011). At the very least, the institutional 
framework surrounding the policy implies a significant time delay between the decision to begin 
removing the injected reserves and an increase in the policy rate. This delay was indeed seen in the 
Japanese experience of QE (Bernanke and Reinhart, 2004).   
While the above mechanism would operate to reduce nominal interest rates, only if real interest rates 
are reduced will consumption and investment respond (Lucas and Prescott, 1971; Boyle and Guthrie, 
2003). With constant inflation expectations, the nominal and real interest rates would move one-for-
                                                            
11 ݅௧௅is the long-term bond rate with a maturity of T periods at time t; ݅௧ is the short-term rate at time t (the policy rate) and ߠ௧௅ is the risk-
premium on the long-term bond with the given maturity (Clouse et al., 2003). 
12 Recently, the Federal Reserve was given the power to pay interest on both required reserves and excess reserves by the Emergency 
Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (Federal Reserve, 2008a). While the new interest rate could be raised above the policy rate, this would 
be theoretically and practically equivalent to a rise in the policy rate (Bernanke, 2009). Large capital losses would therefore also occur if this 
alternative action was taken.  
(3.1)
24 
 
one as per the Fisher equation13 so that the manipulation of expectations using QE would reduce real, 
long-term interest rates. Moreover, considerable concern has been expressed regarding the policy’s 
negative effect on the monetary authority’s ability to control inflation (Feldstein, 2010) and there is 
evidence that this raised inflation expectations each time it has been used (Krisnamurthy and Vissing-
Jorgensen, 2011; Ugai, 2006). Another channel is therefore through raising inflation expectations 
which would reduce real interest rates further.   
3.2.1.2. Risk Premia 
Long-term interest rates are also determined by the risk premia term ሺߠ௧௅ሻ. In general, this term 
depends on illiquidity, default and duration risk. Duration risk refers to the asset price fluctuations 
investors are exposed to due to changes in inflation and interest rates over the maturity of the bond. 
Despite a risk averse investor demanding a premium for this risk, the large-scale purchase of longer 
term treasury securities reduces their relative supply and therefore lowers the total amount of duration 
risk in the market. With market segmentation according to the preferred habitat theory,14 this should 
result in a lower overall premium. This effect would be strengthened by the policy providing a 
credible signal regarding the future course of interest rates, alleviating some of the uncertainty 
regarding future interest rate changes.  
While the default and liquidity premiums are not relevant for government securities, a fall in the 
liquidity premium certainly represents another channel for reducing interest rates on MBS and 
corporate debt. Following the realisation of the losses on sub-prime mortgages, there was a substantial 
fall in US house prices due to a decline in household demand for housing and a large increase in 
foreclosures (Mishkin, 2011; Kamin and DeMarco, 2010). This was accompanied by a significant 
decline in liquidity in the MBS market due to heightened risk aversion (Hancock and Passmore, 2011). 
The purchase of $1.25 trillion worth of MBS and the reinvestment of interest repayments involved the 
Federal Reserve acting like a ‘buyer of last resort’ leading to an increase in liquidity in the market 
                                                            
13 ݅௧ ൌ  ܧ௧ሺߨ௧ାଵሻ ൅ ݎ௧ where ݅௧ is the nominal interest rate, ܧ௧ሺߨ௧ାଵሻ is the expected inflation rate next period and ݎ௧ is the real interest rate. 
14The preferred habitat theory is based upon investors only trading in securities within certain maturity bands or classes. This results in very 
similar assets ceasing to be perfect substitutes for each other. Their rates of return will therefore not be equalised as there is limited arbitrage 
between the long-term to the short-term markets (Juttner and Hawtrey, 1997) 
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through private investors becoming confident that the market would receive strong, ongoing central 
bank support (Joyce et al., 2010). Liquidity premiums should therefore fall, reducing these assets’ 
interest rates. Hancock and Passmore (2011) present convincing evidence that this channel has been 
operative over 2008-2010.  
3.2.2. Portfolio Rebalancing Effect 
In addition to the signalling and risk premia channels, QE can also lower long-term nominal interest 
rates by altering the supply of various assets in the financial system. If investors have portfolio 
preferences or preferred habitats, then the reduction in the supply of certain assets will induce them to 
purchase substitutes to return their portfolios to their desired composition. The resulting increase in 
demand for these substitutes will reduce their yield (Gagnon et al., 2010). This process would be 
assisted by arbitrage between the various asset markets by speculators. Consequently, the targeted 
purchases by the Federal Reserve15 will not only lower the yields on these assets but will lead to 
broader falls in yields.  
3.2.3. Private Sector Balance Sheets, the Supply of Credit and the External Finance Premium 
The GFC led to a significant deterioration in the balance sheets of financial institutions which had a 
significant impact on the amount of borrowing and lending occurring in the economy. Financial 
institutions suffered large capital losses which certainly reduced their willingness and/or ability to 
lend, even if the losses did not endanger their survival. Much research on the effect of such a ‘credit 
crunch’ has been undertaken, especially in relation to the Great Depression and Japan’s experiences 
between 1990-2006. Friedman and Schwartz (1963) argue that the lack of liquidity in the banking 
sector during the Great Depression, brought on by a crisis of confidence, led to a large decrease in 
lending and the money supply. Bernanke (1983) found that the issue of lender solvency constrained 
credit flows in the Great Depression even after 1933, with small to medium businesses and 
homeowners particularly affected. The experience in the home loan market was particularly severe 
with some lenders nearly exiting the market (Bernanke, 1983).  
                                                            
15In the current context, the Federal Reserve has concentrated its government bond purchases in the longer maturity end of the yield curve in 
an attempt to increase the demand for these bonds, pushing up prices and hence lowering yields (Doh, 2010). 
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Firms also experienced large deteriorations in their balance sheets which increased the level of 
deliberate credit rationing and borrowing costs. Due to informational asymmetries in credit markets, it 
is argued that lenders will use credit rationing based on observable borrower characteristics to allocate 
credit because of moral hazard and adverse selection considerations (Walsh, 2003; Stiglitz and Weiss, 
1981). The information asymmetries also lead to an external finance premium due to the existence of a 
‘state verification cost’ (Walsh, 2003; Townsend, 1979). The premium compensates the lender for 
bearing this cost (Bernanke & Gertler, 1989, 1995) and is closely linked to borrowers’ net worth 
(Bernanke et al., 1999). In times of crisis, this premium rises, which in turn raises the effective 
borrowing costs of firms and hence discourages investment (Bernanke et al., 1999).  
QE may reduce credit rationing and the external finance premium in a number of ways. First, through 
the direct purchase of corporate debt and treasury securities from firms, the central bank bypasses 
these effects and provides the necessary cash for these institutions to invest. Furthermore, QE 
generates asset price increases which would improve the liquidity and quality of firms’ balance sheets. 
While there appears little evidence of financial institutions rationing credit to large firms (Fisher, 
2010), these balance sheet improvements would lower borrowing costs and improve credit availability 
to small/medium enterprises. In turn, this would assist the recovery of investment and employment.  
Second, the provision of liquidity through the purchase of MBS, corporate debt and government 
securities would remove any balance sheet constraints on financial institutions’ ability to lend. The 
purchases also provided the financial system with enormous amounts of reserves, alleviating 
illiquidity concerns and so improving firms’ access to capital for investment.  
Third, the policy largely involves the purchase of government bonds and MBS with small purchases of 
corporate debt. The increase in demand should raise the prices of these assets, increasing the net worth 
of those holding them. At the same time, the sale of these assets by firms alters the liquidity of their 
balance sheet. This would reduce the state verification cost of lenders as fire-sales of illiquid assets 
would not need to be conducted as much (Bernanke et al., 1999). Consequently, the net worth of firms 
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and the quality of their net worth should rise, lowering the external finance premium and hence 
borrowing costs.  
The higher asset prices induced by the policy would also improve consumer balance sheets causing an 
increase in consumption through wealth effects and the removal of liquidity constraints. Through the 
purchase of MBS and government securities, the Federal Reserve attempted to improve equity and 
house prices, raising household wealth (Hancock and Passmore, 2011). Estimates of these wealth 
effects indicate that a $1 increase in housing and equity wealth increases consumption by between 
$0.02-0.08 (US and UK) and $0.04-0.08 (US, UK and Canada) respectively (Dvornak and Kohler, 
2003) which suggests this channel would be significant even after the GFC.  
In conjunction with these wealth effects, the purchases would improve an individual’s access to credit, 
especially in relation to housing which was severely damaged by the sub-prime mortgage collapse. QE 
does this by providing substantial amounts of reserves. This would improve the liquidity and quality of 
the financial intermediaries’ balance sheets, lowering the amount of credit rationing to consumers. 
Indeed, the Federal Reserve has explicitly stated that the purchase of $1.25 tn worth of MBS is aimed 
at improving the state of the housing market by allowing individuals to borrow again (Federal 
Reserve, 2008). Furthermore, given that households' net worth significantly affects their access to 
credit (Iacoviello, 2005), the higher asset prices would enable indebted households to borrow more. 
3.2.4. Government Spending/Taxation 
Both the US and UK versions of the policy involve a substantial purchase of government securities 
(5% and 14% of nominal GDP for the US and UK respectively), funded by the electronic creation of 
reserves. Practically speaking, these reserves pay a significantly lower interest rate than long-term 
government securities (Federal Reserve, 2008a; 2011c)  By purchasing and holding government debt, 
even for a certain period of time, the central bank is essentially monetising the debt, thereby reducing 
the interest payments on the debt. Lower debt repayments would allow the government to lower 
current taxes or not raise future taxes as much while still satisfying its intertemporal budget constraint. 
It has been suggested that such a policy could create expectations of lower government taxes in the 
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future (Bernanke and Reinhart, 2004). Consequently, consumption would rise due to wealth effects 
arising from the negative relation between consumer wealth and taxation. Alternatively, current 
government expenditure could rise and/or future government expenditure would not need to be 
reduced as much. This would improve output and employment which would then lead to higher 
consumption as households gained more income.   
3.2.5. Expectations regarding future macroeconomic variables 
In conjunction with the other channels, private agents’ expectations regarding the future may be 
altered by the policy. For example, forward looking households could come to expect that the policy 
will lead to an improvement in employment and wage outcomes. In turn, this would lead to higher 
spending in the near-term. The plausibility of this channel can be seen in QE’s effect on inflation 
expectations (Krisnamurthy and Jorgensen, 2011; Ugai, 2006).  
3.2.6. Exchange Rates 
In an era of open capital markets, the effect of monetary policy on economic activity through the 
exchange rate is well documented and represents another major channel whereby QE could affect 
output and prices (Mishkin, 2007; Mishkin, 1995; Bernanke et al., 2004; Coenen and Wieland, 2003; 
Bordon and Weber, 2010). In the short-run, a nominal depreciation equates to a real exchange rate 
depreciation and so an improvement in net exports (Krugman, 2000). Foreign investment is thereby 
made more expensive as the currency depreciates which should encourage firms to invest 
domestically. Firms are also more likely to purchase their capital products from domestic firms if there 
are domestic substitutes, owing to the real exchange rate depreciation. A similar analysis applies to 
consumers with a currency depreciation making it more likely for consumers to purchase domestic 
products and services. The nominal depreciation potentially induced by the policy would therefore 
stimulate economic activity.  
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Unfortunately, there appears no unambiguous relationship between QE and the exchange rate because 
of the numerous contradictory effects the policy can have. In the one direction is the role of the carry-
flow trade.16 The purchase of government securities and other financial assets provides investors with 
a zero-yielding asset in return for an asset with a low but positive yield. As a result, return-maximising 
investors would seek to use the newly acquired cash to invest in assets which are yielding the highest 
return. Presently, these high-return assets are located outside of the countries employing QE due to 
stagnant output growth and high unemployment. QE therefore necessitates an increase in the supply of 
domestic currency on the foreign exchange market, which should lead to a nominal depreciation.  
Portfolio rebalancing effects and expectations of higher future inflation will strengthen this effect. If 
investors have preferred portfolios to maximise returns, the sale of government bonds for cash disrupts 
this balance. Investors would respond to this by purchasing more of the desired assets (both domestic 
and international) to restore the desired ratios. This in turn requires that domestic currency is supplied 
for foreign currency, resulting in a currency depreciation, ceteris paribus. Concerns regarding future 
inflation would also induce investors to sell because of the anticipated erosion of the currency’s 
purchasing power, implying a nominal depreciation. 
However, QE may lower investors’ risk appetites and confidence, placing a constraint on the carry 
flow trade effect and leading to an influx of capital into ‘safe’ currencies. Higher inflation expectations 
may also induce purchases of currencies in anticipation of future interest rate rises. Further, QE may 
result in retaliatory policies by foreign governments due to a perception that it is a ‘beggar they 
neighbour’ policy.  
It appears that there were declines in the $US/£UK nominal exchange rates immediately after each 
phase of QE was announced but since 2010, these exchange rates have returned to their pre-policy 
levels. Given the apparently inconclusive evidence and the lack of empirical research, this particular 
channel will not be incorporated in the model. A careful empirical examination of QE’s effect on 
exchange rates lies beyond the scope of this thesis but represents an avenue for future research. 
                                                            
16 The carry flow trade is the process whereby investors borrow in a currency with low domestic interest rates and then use these borrowed 
funds to purchase assets in countries with higher interest rates in order to maximise their returns (Debelle, 2006).  
30 
 
IV. STRUCTURAL MODEL 
The base model which this thesis draws upon is the model developed by Gilchrist et al. (2009) who 
augment the Smets and Wouters (2007) model (hereafter ‘SW model’) with a ‘financial accelerator.’ 
The SW model is a medium-scale macroeconomic model similar to the canonical New Keynesian 
model (Gali, 2008). It incorporates imperfect competition, limits on the ability of firms to adjust prices 
as in Calvo (1983) and a variety of additional non-financial frictions which are relevant to the 
questions analysed in this thesis. These include: variable capital utilisation, wage and price indexation, 
labour unions generating a wage mark-up and time-dependent wage determination. 
While there were a number of competing models, the SW model was chosen as the base model for 
analysing the potential macroeconomic effects of the policy for two reasons. First, it fits the US data 
very well and embodies a micro-founded framework, thereby avoiding the Lucas (1976) critique as 
much as possible. Second, it is widely accepted as a benchmark model for monetary policy analysis 
(Adjemian et al., 2008).  
Nevertheless, the SW model has the crucial limitation that it does not contain sufficient financial 
market imperfections to ascertain whether QE can have an effect on output and prices. This somewhat 
limits its application to QE. Financial frictions are vital because of the empirical evidence and the 
result by Curdia and Woodford (2010) that under perfect competition, separable money balances with 
a satiation level and complete financial markets, an irrelevance proposition may be proven for the 
excess supply of bank reserves.  
Gilchrist et al. (2009) introduces an external finance premium to the SW model by assuming there is 
an information asymmetry between borrowers and lenders leading to a wedge between the return to 
capital and the risk-free rate. This extension was selected from a variety of candidates because it 
contains two of the main shocks believed to have caused the GFC: a shock to the external finance 
premium (i.e. yield spreads) and a shock to the net worth of firms and consumers (Blanchard, 2010). 
The model also closely fits the data (Pagan and Robinson, 2011) and so presents a plausible 
framework for the experiments outlined in section 5.  
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Nevertheless, to comprehensively examine QE and the various channels through which it could work 
it was necessary to augment the SW model further. In this section, the basic underlying structure will 
be set out first, followed by the log-linearised equations and then the various augmentations to the 
Gilchrist et al. (2009) version of the SW model.  
4.1 Outline of Smets and Wouters (2007)  
There are five agents in the model: households, labour unions, intermediate goods firms, final goods 
firms and the government. Households seek to maximise their objective utility function by choosing 
consumption, the amount of labour to supply to labour unions, bonds, investment and capital 
utilisation.  
Within each industry type, labour unions aggregate the homogeneous household labour, differentiate it 
and then sell it to labour companies, subject to time-dependent wage adjustment based on Calvo 
(1983). They distribute any profit back to the households that make up the union. The labour 
companies combine the differentiated labour into a homogeneous aggregate labour bundle which they 
then sell to intermediate goods firms.  
Intermediate goods firms seek to maximise profits by renting capital and differentiated labour and 
selling their differentiated goods to final goods producers. In turn, final goods producers seek to 
maximise profit in a perfectly competitive market by repackaging intermediate goods and selling them 
to consumers, investors and the government. The following outline draws heavily on the supporting 
appendix to the SW model.  
4.1.1 Households 
There exists a continuum of infinitely lived households which maximise the expected present 
discounted value of utility given by:17  
ܧ௧ ෍ ߚ௦ ൤
1
1 െ ߪ௖ ሺܥ௧ା௦ሺ݆ሻ െ  ߣܥ௧ା௦ିଵሻ
ଵିఙ೎൨ ݁ݔ݌ ൬ߪ௖ െ 11 ൅ ߪ௟ ܮ௧ା௦ሺ݆ሻ
ଵାఙ೗൰
ஶ
௦ୀ଴
 
                                                            
17 The omission of money balances from the utility function is not crucial. It is assumed that the central bank supplies reserves to satisfy the 
level of money demand at the desired level for the policy rate. 
(4.1)
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where ߪ௖ is the co-efficient of relative risk aversion, ߪ௟ is the elasticity of substitution of leisure and 
ߣ is the degree of external consumption habits.  
Each household seeks to maximise their utility by choosing consumption ሺܥ௧ሺ݆ሻ), hours 
worked ሺܮ௧ሺ݆ሻሻ, investment ሺܫ௧ሺ݆ሻሻ, capital utilisation ሺݑ௧ሺ݆ሻሻ and bonds ሺܤ௧ሺ݆ሻ) subject to an 
intertemporal budget constraint, a capital accumulation constraint and a capital utilisation constraint.  
ܥ௧ା௦ሺ݆ሻ ൅ ܫ௧ା௦ሺ݆ሻ ൅ 
ܤ௧ା௦ሺ݆ሻ
ߝܾݐ ܴ௧ା௦ ௧ܲା௦
െ ௧ܶା௦  
൑  ܤ௧ା௦ିଵሺ݆ሻ
௧ܲା௦
൅ ௧ܹା௦
௛ ሺ݆ሻܮ௧ା௦ሺ݆ሻ
௧ܲା௦
൅ ܦ݅ݒ௧ା௦
௧ܲା௦
൅ ܴ௧ା௦
௞ ݑ௧ା௦ሺ݆ሻܭഥ௧ା௦ିଵሺ݆ሻ
௧ܲା௦
െ ܽሺݑ௧ା௦ሺ݆ሻሻܭഥ௧ା௦ିଵሺ݆ሻ 
 
ܭഥ௧ሺ݆ሻ ൌ ሺ1 െ ߜሻܭഥ௧ିଵሺ݆ሻ ൅  ߝ௧௜ ቈ1 െ ܵ ቆ
ܫ௧ሺ݆ሻ
ܫ௧ିଵሺ݆ሻቇ቉ ܫ௧ሺ݆ሻ 
 
ܭ௧௦ሺ݆ሻ ൌ ݑ௧ሺ݆ሻܭഥ௧ିଵሺ݆ሻ 
 
The intertemporal budget constraint requires the net present value of consumption, investment, the 
costs of adjusting the capital utilisation rate ቀܽ൫ݑ௧ା௦ሺ݆ሻ൯ܭഥ௧ା௦ିଵሺ݆ሻቁ and bond purchases to equal the 
net present value of after tax bond income ቀ஻೟శೞషభሺ௝ሻ௉೟శೞ ቁ, labour income ൬
ௐ೟శೞ೓ ሺ௝ሻ௅೟శೞሺ௝ሻ
௉೟శೞ ൰ 18, labour union 
dividends ቀ஽௜௩೟శೞ௉೟శೞ ቁ and capital income ൬
ோ೟శೞೖ ௨೟శೞሺ௝ሻ௄ഥ೟శೞషభሺ௝ሻ
௉೟శೞ ൰.
 19 ߝ௧௕ represents an exogenous shock to 
bond returns. 
 
The capital accumulation constraint incorporates an increasing marginal adjustment cost for 
investment ቀቂ1 െ ܵ ቀ ூ೟ሺ௝ሻூ೟షభሺ௝ሻቁቃቁ with ܵሺߛሻ ൌ  ܵ
ᇱሺߛሻ ൌ 0, ܵᇱᇱ ൐ 0 and an investment specific technology 
shock ൫ߝ௧௜൯. The capital utilisation constraint indicates that the level of capital services available to be 
used by intermediate goods firms ൫ܭ௧௦ሺ݆ሻ൯  is the product of the previous period’s capital 
stock ሺܭഥ௧ିଵሺ݆ሻሻ and the utilisation rate൫ݑݐሺ݆ሻ൯.    
                                                            
18 ௧ܹା௦௛ ሺ݆ሻ is the wage household j receives for supplying their labour to union j. 
19ܴ௧ା௦௞  is the return on a unit of capital services. 
(4.2)
(4.3)
(4.4)
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The households’ problem yields the following first order conditions with the j index dropped because 
all households are homogeneous and so will all make the same choices.  
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ܫ௧ିଵ൰ ൅ ߚܧ௧ ቈΞ௧ାଵ
௞ ߝ௧ାଵ௜ ܵԢ ൬
ܫ௧ାଵ
ܫ௧ ൰ ൬
ܫ௧ାଵ
ܫ௧ ൰
ଶ
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Ξ௧௞ ൌ  ߚܧ௧ ൥Ξ௧ାଵ ൭
ܴ௧ାଵ௞
௧ܲାଵ
ݑ௧ାଵ െ  ܽሺݑ௧ାଵሻ൱ ൅ Ξ௧ାଵ௞ ሺ1 െ ߜሻ൩ 
 
 
ܴ௧௞
௧ܲ
ൌ  ܽԢሺݑ௧ሻ 
Equation 4.5 is a standard labour supply equation which links the real wage received by the 
households ൬௪೟೓௉೟ ൰ with the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure. Equation 4.6 
and 4.7 are standard Euler equations relating the expected marginal utility of current consumption with 
the expected marginal utility of future consumption, where Ξ௧ is the Lagrange multiplier associated 
with the budget constraint in the optimisation problem. Equations 4.8 and 4.9 determine the optimal 
choice of investment by relating the marginal cost with the marginal benefit. Ξ௧௞ refers to the Lagrange 
multiplier on the capital accumulation constraint. Equation 4.10 relates the marginal cost of changing 
the capital utilisation rate ሺܽԢሺܼ௧ሻሻ to the higher capital income that is derived from supplying more 
capital services to intermediate goods producers.   
 
 
(4.5)
(4.6)
(4.7)
(4.8)
(4.9)
(4.10)
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4.1.2 Labour Market 
Labour unions take the homogeneous labour from households and differentiate it before on-selling it 
to labour companies. Labour companies then aggregate the differentiated labour using a constant 
elasticity of substitution (CES) function. Finally, they sell the labour good to intermediate goods 
producers in a perfectly competitive market. The demand for each unit of differentiated labour is 
derived from the profit maximisation problem of the labour companies: 
 
݉ܽݔ
ܮ௧ ௧ܹܮ௧ െ ௧ܹሺ݆ሻܮ௧ሺ݆ሻ        ݏ. ݐ.  ܮ௧ ൌ  ቎නሺܮ௧ሺ݆ሻሻ
భ
భశഊೢ,೟݆݀
ଵ
଴
቏
ଵାఒೢ,೟
 
where ௧ܹ and ܮ௧ represent the aggregate wage and labour respectively. ௧ܹሺ݆ሻ and ܮ௧ሺ݆ሻ are the wages 
paid to and labour demanded from labour union j. ߣ௪,௧ is the elasticity of substitution between the 
differentiated labour bundles from the different unions.  
The first order condition of this problem yields the labour demand function for each union’s 
differentiated labour: 
ܮ௧ሺ݆ሻ ൌ  ൬ ௧ܹ
ሺ݆ሻ
௧ܹ
൰
൬ିభశഊೢ,೟ഊೢ,೟ ൰ ܮ௧ 
The labour company’s problem under perfect competition yields the equation for aggregate wages as a 
function of industry wages.  
௧ܹ ൌ  ቎නሺ ௧ܹሺ݆ሻሻ
భ
ഊೢ,೟݆݀
ଵ
଴
቏
ఒೢ,೟
 
Labour unions take this demand for their labour as given and seek to maximise their profits which they 
then return to households. The labour unions are subject to time dependent wage adjustment which 
means that they can only adjust wages with probability 1- ߞ௪௦  each period as in Erceg et al. (2000). The 
union seeks to maximise the expected discounted present value of the differential between the wage it 
pays to households and the wage it offers to the labour company over the period when its wage will be 
fixed by selecting the optimal wage W෩୲ሺjሻ. 
(4.11)
(4.12)
(4.13)
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݉ܽݔ
W෩୲ሺjሻ ܧ௧ ෍ ߞ௪
௦
ஶ
௦ୀ଴
൤ߚ
௦Ξ୲ାୱP୲
Ξ௧ ௧ܲା௦ ൨ ሾ ௧ܹା௦ሺ݆ሻ െ ௧ܹା௦
௛ ሿܮ௧ା௦ሺ݆ሻ 
subject to the labour demand constraint:  
ܮ௧ሺ݆ሻ ൌ  ൬ ௧ܹ
ሺ݆ሻ
௧ܹ
൰
൬ିభశഊೢ,೟ഊೢ,೟ ൰ ܮ௧ 
It is assumed that unions are owned by households and so they discount the future at the households’ 
stochastic discount factor ቂఉೞஆ౪శ౩P౪ஆ೟௉೟శೞ ቃ. Wage indexation is present in the model so that when a firm 
cannot re-optimise, the nominal wage they receive grows at the deterministic growth rate of 
technology ሺγሻ and a weighted average of last period’s inflation and the steady state inflation rate 
(π୲ା୪ିଵங౭ πכଵିங౭ሻ.  
௧ܹା௦ሺ݆ሻ ൌ  W෩୲ሺjሻ ൭ෑ γπ୲ା୪ିଵங౭
ୱ
୪ୀଵ
πכଵିங౭൱ 
The first order condition is given below after substituting in the household labour supply decision 
derived above and multiplying by the optimal wage: 
 
ܧ௧ ෍ ߞ௪௦
ஶ
௦ୀ଴
൤ߚ
௦Ξ୲ାୱP୲
Ξ௧ ௧ܲା௦ ൨ ܮ௧ା௦ሺ݆ሻ
1
ߣ௪,௧ା௦ ൣ൫1 ൅ ߣ௪,௧ା௦൯ ௧ܹା௦
௛ െ  ܺ௧,௦W෩୲ሺjሻ൧ ൌ 0 
where 
 ܺ௧,௦ ൌ  ൞
1 ݂݋ݎ ݏ ൌ 0
ෑ γπ୲ା୪ିଵங౭
ୱ
୪ୀଵ
πכଵିங౭݂݋ݎ ݏ ൌ 1, … , ∞ൢ 
Essentially, equation 4.18 captures the fact that the fixed wage is only indexed to inflation and the 
deterministic growth rate in future periods. Equation 4.17 relates the optimal price to a weighted 
average of wages and is used to determine the path of the real wage around the steady state.  
 
 
(4.14)
(4.15)
(4.16)
(4.17)
(4.18)
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4.1.3 Final Goods Firms 
Final goods producers seek to maximise profits by purchasing intermediate goods, packaging them 
and selling them to consumers, investors and the government. They operate under perfect competition, 
taking the price of output as given. Consequently, their maximisation problem becomes: 
݉ܽݔ
௧ܻ, ௧ܻሺ݅ሻP୲Y୲ െ න P୲ሺ݅ሻY୲ሺ݅ሻ݀݅
ଵ
଴
 
subject to20 
1 ൌ  න ܩ ቆ ௧ܻሺ݅ሻ
௧ܻ
;  ߣ௣,௧ቇ  ݀݅
ଵ
଴
 
The first order conditions are: 
௧ܲ ൌ  
ߤ௧௙
௧ܻ
න ܩԢ ቆ ௧ܻሺ݅ሻ
௧ܻ
ቇ ௧ܻሺ݅ሻ
௧ܻ
 ݀݅
ଵ
଴
 
 
௧ܲሺ݅ሻ ൌ  ߤ௧௙ܩԢ ቆ ௧ܻ
ሺ݅ሻ
௧ܻ
ቇ 1
௧ܻ
 
Solving out for ߤ௧௙ (which is the Lagrange multiplier) yields a demand schedule for each differentiated, 
intermediate good: 
 
௧ܻሺ݅ሻ ൌ  ௧ܻܩᇱିଵ ቎ ௧ܲ
ሺ݅ሻ
௧ܲ
න ܩԢ ቆ ௧ܻሺ݅ሻ
௧ܻ
ቇ ௧ܻሺ݅ሻ
௧ܻ
 ݀݅
ଵ
଴
቏ 
 
4.1.4 Intermediate Goods Firms 
Intermediate goods firms hire capital and labour in the current period, taking the utilisation rate as 
given, and produce differentiated goods which they then sell to final goods producers. Each firm has 
some product market power, which introduces a price mark-up, but is only able to alter their prices 
each period with a given, exogenous probability as in Calvo (1983). Firms seek to maximise profit 
                                                            
20 ܩ ቀ௒೟ሺ௜ሻ௒೟ ;  ߣ௣,௧ቁ is a constant-returns-to-scale variety aggregator which is able to replicate any demand curve including a demand curve with 
a non-constant elasticity (Kimball, 1995). The  constant-elasticity aggregator of Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) is a special case of this general 
aggregator.  
(4.19)
(4.20)
(4.21)
(4.22)
(4.23)
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݉ܽݔ
ܭ௧௦, ܮ௧P୲ሺ݅ሻ ௧ܻሺ݅ሻ െ ௧ܹܮ௧ െ ܴ௧
௞ܭ௧௦ 
subject to 
௧ܻሺ݅ሻ ൌ  ߝ௧௔ሺܭ௧௦ሺ݅ሻሻఈሺߛ௧ܮ௧ሺ݅ሻሻଵିఈ െ ߛ௧Φ 
where 0 ൏ ߙ ൏ 1. In 4.24 and 4.25, ௧ܻሺ݅ሻ is the intermediate goods output of firm i, γ is the labour 
augmenting technology growth rate, ߝ௧௔ is a technology shock and Φ is the fixed production costs. The 
firm’s optimisation problem becomes:  
ࣦ ൌ  ݉ܽݔܭ௧௦, ܮ௧P୲ሺ݅ሻ ௧ܻሺ݅ሻ െ  ௧ܹܮ௧ െ ܴ௧
௞ܭ௧௦ െ Θ௧ሺ݅ሻሾ ௧ܻሺ݅ሻ െ ߝ௧௔ሺܭ௧௦ሺ݅ሻሻఈሺߛ௧ܮ௧ሺ݅ሻሻଵିఈሿ 
The first order conditions yield demand schedules for both capital and labour as follows: 
Θ௧ሺ݅ሻߛ௧ሺଵିఈሻሺ1 െ ߙሻߝ௧௔ሺܭ௧௦ሺ݅ሻሻఈሺܮ௧ሺ݅ሻሻିఈ ൌ ௧ܹ 
 
Θ௧ሺ݅ሻߛ௧ሺଵିఈሻሺߙሻߝ௧௔ሺܭ௧௦ሺ݅ሻሻఈିଵሺܮ௧ሺ݅ሻሻଵିఈ ൌ ܴ௧௞ 
Combining these yields the relationship between capital services and labour: 
ܭ௧௦ ൌ  
ߙ
1 െ ߙ
௧ܹ
ܴ௧௞
ܮ௧ 
Using this and the result that the marginal cost for each firm is equal to the Lagrange multiplier 
(Sydsaeter & Hammond, 2008) yields and expression for the firms’ marginal cost 
 
Θ௧ ൌ  ܯܥ௧ ൌ  ߙିఈሺ1 െ ߙሻିሺଵିఈሻ ௧ܹଵିఈሺܴ௧௞ሻఈߛି௧ሺଵିఈሻሺߝ௧௔ሻିଵ 
 
Note that the marginal cost (ܯܥ௧ሻ is the same across firms because they are all homogeneous and so 
they all make the same price, capital and labour choices in equilibrium. 
 
The firm faces time-dependent pricing and so they seek to maximise the discounted flow of profits 
over the expected interval when the price cannot be changed. As with labour unions, firms are owned 
by households and so they discount the future using the households’ stochastic discount factor. 
Further, when fixed their price is indexed to the deterministic growth rate and a weighted average of 
past and steady state inflation ሺ∏ ߛߨ௧ା௟ିଵఐೢ௦௟ୀଵ ߨכଵିఐೢሻ.  
(4.24)
(4.25)
(4.26)
(4.27)
(4.28)
(4.29)
(4.30)
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This yields the optimisation problem: 
݉ܽݔ
P෩୲ሺ݅ሻ ܧ௧ ෍ ߞ௣
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ஶ
௦ୀ଴
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௦Ξ୲ାୱP୲
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௟ୀଵ
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subject to the demand function for the firm’s goods 
௧ܻା௦ሺ݅ሻ ൌ  ௧ܻା௦ܩԢିଵ ቌ ௧ܲ
ሺ݅ሻܺ௧ା௦
௧ܲା௦
቎න ܩԢ ൬ ௧ܻା௦ሺ݅ሻ
௧ܻା௦
൰
ଵ
଴
௧ܻା௦ሺ݅ሻ
௧ܻା௦
቏ቍ 
This problem is equivalent to maximising the following objective function subject to equation 4.3521 
 
݉ܽݔ
P෩୲ሺ݅ሻ ܧ௧ ෍ ߞ௣
௦
ஶ
௦ୀ଴
൤ߚ
௦Ξ୲ାୱP୲
Ξ௧ ௧ܲା௦ ൨ ൣ
෨ܲ௧ሺ݅ሻ ܺ௧,௦െܯܥ௧ା௦൧ ௧ܻା௦ሺ݅ሻ 
Defining  
߬௧ା௦ ൌ  ቎න ܩԢ ൬ ௧ܻା௦
ሺ݅ሻ
௧ܻା௦
൰
ଵ
଴
௧ܻା௦ሺ݅ሻ
௧ܻା௦
቏ 
allows one to redefine equation 4.32 as  
௧ܻା௦ሺ݅ሻ ൌ  ௧ܻା௦ܩԢିଵ ൬ ௧ܲ
ሺ݅ሻܺ௧ା௦
௧ܲା௦
߬௧ା௦൰ 
The first order condition of from this optimisation problem is: 
 
ܧ௧ ෍ ߞ௣௦
ஶ
௦ୀ଴
൤ߚ
௦ߌ௧ା௦ ௧ܲ
ߌ௧ ௧ܲା௦ ൨ ቈ
෨ܲ௧ሺ݅ሻܺ௧ା௦ ൅ ൫ ෨ܲ௧ሺ݅ሻܺ௧ା௦ െ ܯܥ௧ା௦൯
1
ܩᇱିଵሺݖ௧ା௦ሻ
ܩᇱሺݔ௧ା௦ሻ
ܩᇱᇱሺݔ௧ା௦ሻ቉ ௧ܻା௦ሺ݅ሻ ൌ 0 
 
where  
ݔ௧ା௦ ൌ  ܩᇱିଵሺݖ௧ା௦ሻ ൌ  ܩᇱିଵ ቆ ௧ܲା௦
ሺ݅ሻ
௧ܲା௦
߬௧ା௦ቇ 
Combining this condition with the maximisation conditions for final goods producers yields an 
expression for the aggregate price index. 
 
                                                            
21ܺ௧,௦ is defined by equation 4.18 
(4.31)
(4.33)
(4.34)
(4.35)
(4.36)
(4.37)
(4.32)
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௧ܲ ൌ ൫1 െ ߦ௣൯ܩᇱିଵ ቆ ௧ܲ
ሺ݅ሻ
௧ܲ
߬௧ቇ ൅ ߦ௣ ௧ܲିଵ ቀߨ௧ିଵ
ఐ೛ ߨכଵିఐ೛ቁ ܩᇱିଵ ቌ
௧ܲିଵ ቀߨ௧ିଵ
ఐ೛ ߨכଵିఐ೛ቁ
௧ܲ
߬௧ቍ 
Log-linearising equations 4.36 and 4.38 around a zero inflation steady state and then substituting out 
for the optimal price level yields a version of the New Keynesian Phillips Curve (equation 4.42). 
4.1.5 Government Sector 
The government sector conducts fiscal policy and monetary policy. Fiscal policy is financed through 
lump-sum taxation and issuing one period bonds. The government must satisfy the following budget 
constraint every period: 
 
௧ܲܩ௧ ൅ ܤ௧ିଵ ൌ  ௧ܶ ൅ 
ܤ௧
ܴ௧ 
 
Monetary policy is conducted by supplying households with whatever money stock is required to 
produce the desired nominal interest rate. This is found using the money demand schedule of 
households. The central bank reacts to economy wide variables using the following Taylor rule: 
 
ܴ௧
ܴכ ൌ  ൬
ܴ௧
ܴכ൰
ߩݎ݌ ൥൬ߨ௧ߨכ൰
టభ ቆ ௧ܻ
௧ܻ
௙ቇ
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൩
ଵିߩݎ݌
ۉ
ۈ
ۇቀ ௒೟௒೟షభቁ
൬ ௒೟
೑
௒೟షభ೑
൰
ی
ۋ
ۊ
టయ
݁ఌ೟೘ 
where ε୲୫ is the monetary policy shock and ௧ܻ௙ is the level of output obtained under fully flexible 
prices and wages.  
 
 
 
 
 
(4.39)
(4.40)
(4.38)
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4.2 Outline of Gilchrist et al. (2009)  Augmentations 
Gilchrist et al. (2009) introduce an external finance premium of the kind developed by Bernanke et al. 
(1999) into the SW model in the following way. Instead of intermediate goods producers, 
entrepreneurs hire capital and labour from households and financial institutions to produce 
differentiated intermediate goods which they then sell to final goods producers. Entrepreneurs are 
assumed to survive to the next period at an exogenous rate (θ) with those who do not survive simply 
consuming their net worth. In the next period, new entrepreneurs enter so that the stock of 
entrepreneurs remains constant over time.22  
Entrepreneurs finance their capital and labour purchases through their borrowings and net worth.23 In 
the Gilchrist et al. (2009) model (hereafter ‘GOZ model’) it is assumed that there is a costly state 
verification problem for financial institutions. The entrepreneurs may observe the return on their 
capital but financial institutions cannot, unless they pay an ‘auditing cost’ which is assumed to be a 
proportion of the gross return on the entrepreneur’s capital (Bernanke et al., 1999: 1350). This 
information asymmetry generates an external finance premium ሺܵ௧ሻ which is negatively related to the 
ratio of entrepreneurs’ net worth to debt. As a result of this augmentation, the price for capital24 and 
resource constraint equations must be altered and the investment specific technology shock is 
removed. Extra equations describing the relationship between the external finance premium and 
                                                            
22 It is assumed that a very small transfer of wealth from households to entrepreneurs occurs so that these new entrepreneurs can start 
business. 
23 In the SW model, entrepreneurs borrow from financial institutions who can perfectly verify the return on capital and so in equilibrium 
firms pay out the full return on capital (Rk) to households. 
24 Equation 4.50 may be derived by realising that the return on capital in the presence of the external finance premium depends on the net 
cost after depreciation of a unit of capital and the marginal revenue that is gained by that unit of capital. The optimality condition in Smets 
and Wouters (2007) is ܳ௧ ൌ  ܧ௧ ቂߚҧ ቀΞ౪శ౩Ξ೟ ቁ ቀܳ௧ାଵሺ1 െ ߜሻ ൅ ݑ௧ାଵݎ௧ାଵ
௞ െ ܽሺݑ௧ାଵሻቁቃ. With an external finance premium, ௧ܵ  enters this condition 
to reflect the extra cost the firm faces when borrowing to purchase a unit of capital. The cost drives a wedge between the return on the risk-
free asset (long-term interest rate) and private capital (Drautzburg and Uhlig, 2011). The condition implies that in the steady state ܴכ௞ ൌ ܵכߚഥ െ
 ሺ1 െ ߜሻ ൌ  ቀ௄ேቁ
ఞ ଵ
ఉ ߛఙ೎ െ ሺ1 െ ߜሻ as entrepreneurs’ return on capital is altered by their degree of leverage. Log-linearising the adjusted 
optimality condition yields the equation above (Appendix, Section K) . Essentially, in the log-linearised equation the real interest rate (rt – 
Etπt+1) is replaced with the new, effective real interest rate (rt – Etπt+1 + st). Due to the profit maximisation of firms ܴ௧௄ ൌ  ݉݌݇௧ for all t so the 
rest of equation 4 in Smets and Wouters (2007) is consistent with the formulation in equation 15 of Gilchrist et al. (2009). 
41 
 
entrepreneurs’ net worth (equation 4.53)25 and the evolution of this net worth over time (equation 
4.54)26 are also incorporated. 
4.3 Dynamic Equations of Gilchrist et al. (2009) 
The first order conditions set out in section 4.1 can be log-linearised around the model’s steady state 
using Uhlig (1995) to give the following dynamic equations27 where ݔො௧ denotes the log deviation of a 
variable from its steady state.  
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25 The relationship between the external finance premium and entrepreneurs’ net worth is defined as ௧ܵ ൌ  ቀ௄೟ொ೟ே೟ ቁ
ఞ ݁ఌ೟೑೏. After transforming 
both sides, the following expression was obtained: ݁௦೟ ൌ  ݁ఞሺ௞೟ା௤೟ା௡೟ሻ݁ఌ೟೑೏. A first order approximation of both sides of this equation around 
the model’s steady state yields equation 4.53. 
26 ො݊௧ ൌ  ௄ே ሺ̂ݎ௧௞ െ  ܧ௧ିଵ̂ݎ௧௞ሻ ൅  ܧ௧ିଵ̂ݎ௧௞  ൅  ߠ ො݊௧ିଵ ൅ ߝ௧௡௪ is an alternative way of expressing the evolution of net worth over time. The other 
representation was used for simplicity. 
27 When deriving equation 4.50 from equation 4.9 one needs to utilise the fact that based on equation 4.10, ݎכ௞ ൌ ܽ′ሺݑכሻ in the steady state. A 
complete derivation is given in the Appendix (Section K).  
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The steady state of the model and the shock processes are described in the appendix (Section D and F 
respectively). For a more detailed description of all these equations, the reader is referred to those in 
both Smets and Wouters (2007) and Gilchrist et al. (2009).  
 
4.4 Augmentations to Gilchrist et al. (2009)  
As it stands, the GOZ model is unable to capture all of the channels through which QE could affect 
economic activity levels. For example, the model does not contain a portfolio rebalancing effect. The 
model must therefore be augmented.  
The augmentations are in three levels so that a number of different effects can be isolated and 
examined. First, a signal effect for the provision of excess reserves was incorporated into the GOZ 
(4.49)
(4.50)
(4.51)
(4.52)
(4.53)
(4.54)
(4.55)
(4.56)
(4.57)
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model. Second, a signal effect and portfolio rebalancing effect were added to the GOZ model. Finally, 
a variable elasticity of the external finance premium to entrepreneurs’ net worth was introduced to 
determine whether QE’s effects were robust to changes in the yield spread arising from financial 
system shocks and independent of entrepreneurs’ net worth.  
4.4.1 Signal Effect in GOZ model 
It was felt that the most effective way to incorporate the signalling channel28 was to alter the Taylor 
rule. The central bank is assumed to set the nominal interest rate in the following way: 
ܴ௧௣
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ൌ  ቆܴ௧ିଵ
௣
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ቇ
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The nominal interest rate set by the monetary authority reacts to the lagged value of the central bank 
balance sheet ሺܧܴ௧ሻ. After taking expectations of both sides, equation 4.58 implies that a large central 
bank balance sheet today will lead private sector participants to expect a lower policy rate tomorrow, 
ceteris paribus. This signal is credible because the large-scale purchase of assets takes considerable 
time to implement and unwind (Shiratsuka, 2009). The results were not sensitive to this specification 
as similar dynamic impulse response functions were obtained when using different lags on the excess 
reserves variable.  
It is assumed that the central bank chooses the size of its balance sheet according to a specific rule. 
Despite the apparent variation between the different versions of the policy as implemented by the 
Federal Reserve, the Bank of England and the Bank of Japan, they have all fundamentally involved the 
central bank independently choosing the level of government securities and other financial assets 
through the creation of central bank reserves. Furthermore, there is little difference between a central 
bank rule for the targeting of a certain monetary aggregate (involving periodic injections or removal of 
liquidity) and the targeting of a level of asset purchases and so a specific rule is a valid representation 
of the QE policy (Curdia and Woodford, 2011).  
                                                            
28 This is defined as the large-scale purchase of assets sending a credible signal that there has been a change in the way the central bank 
responds to economic fluctuations in the short to medium term. 
(4.58)
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It is assumed that the rule takes the following form following Gertler and Karadi (2011): 
 
ܧܴ௧ െ ܧܴכ ൌ   ߢሺܵ௧ െ ܵכሻ 
 
In terms of deviations from the steady state:29  
ܧ෢ܴ ௧ ൌ   ߢ ൬
ܵכ
ܧܴכ൰ ̂ݏ௧ ൌ  
ߢ ቀ௄ேቁ
ఞ ̂ݏ௧
ܧܴכ  
 
One of the primary reasons for QE was a belief that the substantial increases in yield spreads between 
2008-2009 were doing significant damage to economic activity. Indeed, based on Federal Reserve 
minutes it is clear that the extent of monetary policy accommodation was tied to the state of the 
economy and in particular, credit spreads and availability (Federal Reserve, 2011d; Bernanke, 2009). 
This is captured by assuming that the central bank reacts to the deviation of the external finance 
premium from its steady state value when determining the size of its balance sheet (equation 4.59).30  
 
While there was some diversification in the types of assets purchased, the overwhelming majority of 
purchases were in two very narrow asset classes for both the US and the UK (Figures 1 and 2) and so 
it was deemed sufficient to just consider the overall size of the central bank balance sheet instead of 
purchases in specific asset classes. A more detailed division must be left for future research. 
 
4.4.2 Portfolio rebalancing effect in GOZ model 
The first step to introducing both effects into this model is to include a one year nominal interest rate 
into the model in addition to the policy rate. It is assumed that the financial firms which borrow from 
the central bank and lend to households and entrepreneurs, face transaction costs which generate a 
wedge between the policy rate and the new interest rate. Practically speaking, this appears reasonable 
                                                            
29 Given the definition of the external finance premium, ܵכ ൌ  ቀ௄כொכேכ ቁ
ఞ
. As shown in Smets and Wouters (2007),  ܳכ ൌ 1 so this simplifies to 
ܵכ ൌ  ቀ௄כேכቁ
ఞ
. ܧܴכ was set to 24.30362 which represents a monotonic transformation of the average value over the 2007-2008 period (Federal 
Reserve, 2011a). Alternative transformations were investigated but little changes to the results were obtained.  
30 It appears that the Federal Reserve could have also been targeting the output gap as well as yield spreads using QE. Consequently, an 
investigation into whether a decision rule incorporating the output gap generated different dynamics was conducted ൬ாோ೟ ாோכ ൌ ൬
௒೟
௒೟೑
൰
ି఑
൰. In the 
GOZ model, the external finance premium impulse response is negatively correlated with the output gap impulse response. Hence, this 
alternative formulation did not generate quantitatively important differences. 
(4.59)
(4.60)
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because the Federal Reserve only supplies liquidity to certified financial institutions. Households and 
firms therefore cannot lend and borrow at the risk-free policy rate. While there are a number of 
interpretations for this new nominal rate, for current purposes, the best interpretation is the one year 
government securities interest rate. This approach is similar to that of Drautzburg and Uhlig (2009) 
except that the bond spread is assumed to be time invariant.31 
 
Using the expectations approach to interest rate determination, this new interest rate is determined by a 
weighted average of the current and expected future policy rates in the next three quarters. Persistence 
is also introduced based on empirical evidence of OECD interest rates (Romero-Avila, 2007). The 
results were not sensitive to the assumed degree of persistence or the particular maturity chosen for the 
long-term interest rate.32  
ܴ௧ ൌ  ሺܴ௧ିଵሻఘೝ ቈቀ൫ܴ௧௣൯൫ܴ௧ାଵ௣ ൯൫ܴ௧ାଶ௣ ൯൫ܴ௧ାଷ௣ ൯ቁ
భ
ర቉
ଵିఘೝ
 
In the steady state, the only difference between the rates is the assumed 13 basis points spread based 
on the 1990-2011 average yield spread between the one year treasury security and the federal funds 
rate (Federal Reserve, 2011) so that:33  
ܴכ ൌ  ܴכ௣ ൅ 0.000325 
It should be noted that this means that the issue of the zero lower bound on the interest rate is less 
problematic because agents make decisions based on the new nominal interest rate which remains 
positive even when the policy rate reaches zero. This circumstance is supported by recent evidence 
from a number of countries where the policy rate is now effectively zero (Federal Reserve, 2011b). 
The results were not sensitive to the size of this yield spread.34  
                                                            
31 Introducing the long-term interest rate implies that the Euler equation for households is altered to Ξ௧ ൌ  ߚߝ௧௕ܴ௧ܧ௧ ቂΞ೟శభగ೟శభቃ instead of Ξ௧ ൌ
 ߚߝ௧௕ܴ௧௣ܧ௧ ቂΞ೟శభగ೟శభቃ. 
32 Simulations using a six-month and five-year interest rate did not yield quantitatively different results to those reported. 
33 The 0.000325 is calculated by annualising the steady state real policy rate in the GOZ model which yields a value of 4.8%. The 13 basis 
point yield spread is then added before converting this back into a quarterly interest rate, providing the number used for the simulations.  
34 Simulations were performed using an average yield spread of 200 basis points (reflecting the difference between deposit rates and the 
federal funds rate) and 300 basis points (representing the 1990-2011 average spread between the AAA yield and the federal funds rate) 
without significantly changing any of the results. 
 
(4.61)
(4.62)
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The new nominal rate allows the portfolio rebalancing and risk premium channels to be included 
relatively easily (equation 4.63). It is assumed based on the empirical evidence surveyed in section 2 
that there is a negative relationship between the size of the central bank balance sheet and the long-
term nominal interest rate. The size of the central bank balance sheet is determined as before (equation 
4.59). In this formulation, only one channel is incorporated because under an alternative formulation 
the various effects could be aggregated together anyway (Appendix section J).  
ܴ௧ ൌ  ሺܴ௧ିଵሻఘೝ ቈቀ൫ܴ௧௣൯൫ܴ௧ାଵ௣ ൯൫ܴ௧ାଶ௣ ൯൫ܴ௧ାଷ௣ ൯ቁ
భ
ర ൬ 1ܧܴ௧൰
ద
቉
ଵିఘೝ
 
The precise mechanism through which these effects arise will not be explicitly modelled because this 
thesis desires to take the empirical evidence on these effects as given and then establish the resulting 
impact on the economy. Unfortunately, this approach is susceptible to the Lucas (1976) critique 
because the way that rational investors respond to the provision of central bank reserves may change 
with QE. This thesis attempts to account for such changes but future research should empirically 
estimate these effects, if possible.  
 
4.4.3 Augmented GOZ model with QE and a variable external finance premium 
Much literature has been generated on the way financial institutions respond to variations in output. 
The conclusion reached is that risk premia, a class into which the external finance premium falls, 
varies counter-cyclically over the business cycle (Juttner and Hawtrey, 1997; 590). There has been 
some recent discussion in the literature regarding the counter-cyclical nature of the external finance 
premium and how this increases in periods of financial stress (Justiniano et al., 2011). Key factors 
which contribute to this include: (1) the capital hoarding decisions of financial institutions as they seek 
to repair their balance sheets, (2) internally or externally imposed improvements in monitoring and 
lending standards by financial institutions which create a stronger relationship between entrepreneurs’ 
net worth and the external finance premium and (3) the increase in bad loan write-offs - a phenomenon 
seen during the GFC and for Japan in the 1990s - which undermines financial institutions’ balance 
sheets and makes them more sensitive to variations in the capital-debt ratio of their clients (Blanchard, 
(4.63)
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2010). In the GOZ model, this is equivalent to suggesting that ߯ (the parameter governing the way 
financial institutions respond to entrepreneurs’ net worth) is variable and dependent on output growth. 
Incorporating this feature into the model involves specifying the relationship between the external 
finance premium and entrepreneurs’ net worth in the following manner:  
ܵ௧ ൌ  ൬
ܳ௧ܭ௧
௧ܰ
൰
ఞ೟
݁ఌ೟೑೏ 
As shown in the Appendix (Section G) this implies that:  
 
̂ݏ௧ ൌ  െ߯כ൫ ො݊௧ െ ݍො௧௞ െ ෠݇௧൯ ൅ ߯̂௧ሺlogሺܵכሻሻ  ൅ ߝ௧௙ௗ 
To be consistent with the evidence, ߯௧ should be pro-cyclical. It should also contain a habit component 
because the institutional structure of financial institutions implies that they should only respond 
partially to current economic developments. One tractable and concise way of specifying this is:35 
߯̂௧ ൌ  ߩఞ߯̂௧ିଵ െ ߱ሺݕො௧ െ ݕො௧ିଵሻ; ߩఞ ൌ 0.8, ߱ ൌ 100 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
35 The particular value of ߱ was chosen to roughly match the data from the U.S. economy during 2008-2009. Over both the 1990-2007 
period and the 2001-2007 period the average quarterly growth rate was 0.7%. Between Mar 2008 and June 2009 growth fell to an average of 
-0.9% per quarter (RBA, 2011). When compared with the increase in the BAA spread of 72% (taking into account endogenous movements 
because of changes to entrepreneurs’ net worth) this implies the given value. The results were not sensitive to large changes in this variable 
(Section 5, Tables 4 & 5). 
(4.64)
(4.65)
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V. SIMULATION RESULTS 
 
5.1 Calibration of Model Parameters 
A number of parameter values needed to be chosen before simulating the GOZ model using Dynare. 
The parameter values used by the authors in the provided mod file were used (Appendix, Section A). 
Extensive testing was conducted using two alternative sets of parameters (Appendix, Section A) and it 
was established that the results were not sensitive to this choice.  
The new parameters in the Taylor rule (4.58) ሺ߫ሻ and the long-term interest equation (4.63) ሺ߷ሻ were 
set at 0.15 and 0.1 respectively and were obtained by approximate estimates of the signal provided by 
the central bank and the elasticity of long-term interest rates to the size of the Federal Reserve’s 
balance sheet.36 The response of excess reserves to the external finance premium was set at 2, which is 
lower than the value of 10 set in Gertler and Karadi (2011). It was felt this value was a better 
approximation based on the data.37 
In further extensions of the GOZ model it was necessary to calibrate the responsiveness of the effect 
of the central bank’s balance sheet on the long-term interest rate to output growth as well as the degree 
of counter-cyclical movement in ߯. No literature providing guidance on reasonable values for these 
parameters could be found and so a range of values was utilised.   
 
 
 
                                                            
36 As detailed in Section 2, Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011), Joyce et al. (2010) and Gagnon et al. (2010) all find that the policy 
decreased long-term nominal interest rates by around 60 basis points and lowered expectations regarding the future course of the federal 
funds rate by around 75 basis points. Given the steady state value of the nominal policy rate in the model of 4.8%, this implies an elasticity of 
approximately 0.15 between the policy rate and the central bank balance sheet based on the increase in the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet 
(Federal Reserve, 2011a). The 1962-2011 average for a 1 year Treasury security is 5.829% (Federal Reserve, 2011b) which suggests an 
elasticity of around 0.1 between the long-term interest rate and the central bank balance sheet based upon the same increase in the Federal 
Reserve’s balance sheet. Further simulations indicated that the results were not sensitive to alternative calibrations of these two parameters.  
37 The average BAA-10 year treasury security spread between July 2008-2011 was 3.43%, which is a 72% increase compared to its 2004-
June 2008 average of 1.995% (Federal Reserve, 2011b). The average size of the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet was $2290953 bn over Sep 
2008-2011 compared to an average of $891105 bn between 2007- Sep 2008, representing a 157% increase (Federal Reserve, 2011a). The 
value of ߢ is therefore approximately equal to 2. Using the 2002-Sep 2008 average for the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet yields an increase 
of 179%, which implies ߢ = 2.48. Simulations using this value did not yield substantially different results.  
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5.2 Simulation Results 
Before proceeding to a discussion of the simulation results, it is important to discuss how these 
simulations relate to the GFC. The GFC was characterised by substantial losses in net worth for 
individuals, financial institutions and non-financial institutions due to the collapse of the housing 
market in the US, as well as a substantial increase in borrowing costs, which was reflected in the rise 
in spreads for a large variety of assets (Taylor, 2009, Mishkin, 2011). Within the context of the GOZ 
model, the financial crisis can be plausibly replicated by considering a shock to both the external 
finance premium and entrepreneurs’ net worth. Due to the log-linearised nature of the equations, the 
magnitude of the shocks generating the GFC can be easily replicated by altering the variance of these 
shocks. The model also contains exogenous variations in the returns on the bonds held by households. 
However, the authors state that this shock has similar effects as other external finance premium shocks 
considered by Bernanke et al. (1999) (Smets and Wouters, 2007: 589) which implies that using this 
shock will not add much to the analysis. Moreover, this shock has been criticised for being impossible 
to interpret (Chari et al., 2009). 
One difference between the crisis and these simulations is that the zero lower bound on the nominal 
interest rate appears to remain binding (Federal Reserve, 2011b) while this feature is entirely absent 
from the GOZ model. The presence of the zero lower bound presents a problem to the validity of the 
log-linearisation technique used in this thesis because, once this constraint binds, expectations 
regarding future interest rates and inflation must be formed in a non-linear way.  
The method employed in this thesis overcomes this difference in three ways. First, it is assumed that 
the central bank balance sheet acts as a signal for the future policy rate implying that, if the zero lower 
bound binds, then under the policy it will bind for a longer period of time than that dictated by the 
original policy rule. Second, despite the policy rate reaching its zero lower bound, longer-term interest 
rates have remained positive which leaves open the portfolio rebalancing channel for the policy, even 
if the signalling channel is unavailable. Third, it is well established that log-linearisation may be 
utilised even in the presence of the zero lower bound except the final simulation output must be 
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adjusted (Adolfson et al., 2011; Woodford, 2003; Bodenstein et al., 2010). However, after adjustment, 
the qualitative properties of the various impulse response functions are unaltered and the quantitative 
properties are largely unaltered as well (Gertler and Karadi, 2011; Bodenstein et al., 2010). This 
suggests that none of the following conclusions would be affected by this omission. Subsequent 
research should utilise the algorithm suggested by Bodenstein et al. (2010) to assess the quantitative 
impacts of the zero lower real bound on QE’s effectiveness.  
5.2.1 Response to a shock to net worth and the external finance premium 
The impulse response functions (IRFs) to a one standard deviation innovation to both the net 
worth ሺߝ௧௡௪ሻ and external finance premium shocks ሺߝ௧௙ௗሻ are as expected (Appendix Section B, Figure 
B.1). As the system has been log-linearised, the response of each variable is just the sum of the two 
impulse response functions. Output, investment and employment all fall substantially and the central 
bank responds by decreasing the policy rate which in turn lowers the long-term interest rate. While the 
central bank conducts the traditional function of monetary policy by reducing the interest rate in 
response to these developments, it is insufficient to return output to its steady state value before twenty 
periods. 
5.2.2 Signal Effect in GOZ model 
After the signal channel for the size of the central bank’s balance sheet is introduced, output, 
employment, investment and consumption deviate less from the economy’s steady state. This 
conclusion is based upon nearly all the relevant variables registering smaller negative deviations.38 In 
particular, inflation is stabilised around its steady state value. This suggests that one of the crucial 
benefits of the policy is that it can prevent an economy being caught in a deflationary spiral by 
stabilising inflation expectations. This seems to match the actual inflation response with inflation 
recording one quarter of significant declines (1% per month) before returning to the 2000-2010 decade 
average of 0.2% per month (BLS, 2011). 
                                                            
38 The improvement in the quantitative properties of the impulse response functions was not affected by the choice of lag in the Taylor rule. 
Simulations using a two or four quarter lag returned differences of second order importance. A further simulation using the arithmetic 
average of a two and four quarter signal also did not alter the results substantially.  
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5.2.3 GOZ model with signal and portfolio rebalancing effects 
Incorporating the portfolio rebalancing effect, in addition to the signalling effect, does result in an 
improvement in the policy’s effectiveness (Appendix Section B, Figure B.1). Consumption, 
investment, output and employment all have smaller deviations with the implementation of QE.  
The reason for the improvement is that QE directly induces a lower long-term nominal interest rate 
through the portfolio rebalancing effect and makes the central bank respond more aggressively, ceteris 
paribus, to declines in output and inflation. In turn, this raises inflation expectations and so reduces the 
real interest rate. The intuition is that the response of the policy rate is expected to be larger and for a 
longer period of time due to the signalling effect. In turn, agents anticipate higher marginal costs in the 
future and so higher inflation.  The lower real interest rate stimulates consumption and investment 
relative to when QE is not implemented, raising output. Romer (1992, 1993) presents convincing 
evidence that this real interest rate transmission mechanism generated output increases post-1933, 
during a period of similar financial distress, adding credibility to these simulation results.  
The higher investment generates a higher capital stock. Due to a stable depreciation rate this creates a 
persistent increase in capital, raising the marginal productivity of labour and so wages and 
employment according to the assumptions on the production function ( ܨ௅௄ᇱᇱ ሺܭ, ܮሻ ൐ 0). These results 
appear in line with preliminary empirical work by Baumeister and Benati (2010), adding plausibility 
to these simulations.  
The simulations also demonstrate two further results in relation to QE. First, they show that the central 
bank is not required to lower the policy rate by as much because of the increase in inflation 
expectations. The result suggests that the use of QE can not only help an economy in a liquidity trap 
but may also help an economy avoid a liquidity trap if implemented aggressively at the beginning of a 
GFC-like crisis.   
The second result is that despite these improvements, the policy leads to substantially higher inflation 
and inflationary expectations over a very extended horizon (between 40-60 quarters). The implication 
is that while the policy may be able to generate reasonable improvements in output and employment, 
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these come at the cost of higher inflation in the medium to long-term. While beneficial during a 
deflationary period, like the Japanese economy between 2001-2006 and the U.S. economy between 
Aug-Dec 2008, this would prove detrimental if inflation remained robustly positive after a GFC-like 
financial crisis. However, this conclusion depends on the specific ‘exit strategy’ the central bank is 
assumed to follow based on its policy rule (equation 4.59). The adoption of a more rapid removal of 
excess reserves tied to improvements in output could avoid this result. Such dynamic regime switches 
are unfortunately beyond the scope of this thesis because they cannot be easily incorporated into a log-
linearised framework. The reason is that such regime switches violate the assumption of a log-
linearised framework that the underlying identities hold throughout all time.  
5.2.4 GOZ model with variable elasticity of external finance premium to entrepreneurs’ net 
worth 
The addition of a variable external finance premium does have an effect on the welfare improvements 
from QE. The simulation results indicate that the presence of counter-cyclical financial distortions 
only marginally diminishes QE’s effectiveness. Over a policy horizon of 20 quarters, the addition of a 
signalling function leads to smaller improvements in output, investment, employment and inflation, 
although the change is not quantitatively large. QE also continues to stimulate investment, though the 
effect is now quite small. Furthermore, the observed external finance premium is significantly lower, 
which is one indicator that the policy also reduces the degree of financial stress (Appendix Section B, 
Figure B.2). The mechanism through which these improvements come about is unchanged.  
The same conclusions are reached when the signal and portfolio rebalancing channels are included 
Appendix Section B, Figure B.2). Ultimately, it seems that QE is not affected too much by changes in 
financial institutions’ lending standards as they seek to repair their balance sheets over time. These 
results also highlight that financial frictions enable monetary policy to remain effective at the zero 
lower bound without resorting to permanent increases in the money base contrary to Eggertsson and 
Woodford (2003).  
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5.2.5 Introduction of a variable influence of the central bank balance sheet 
There has been some discussion that significant financial crises like the GFC result in significant 
alterations in financial market participants’ behaviour especially in regard to their risk-appetites and 
hoarding of capital (Gale and Yorulmazer, 2011; Kamada and Sugo, 2006). If this were the case then it 
could be that the purchase of financial assets only resulted in a large increase in financial institutions’ 
holdings of cash without the subsequent rebalancing of portfolios. Based on the money base statistics 
for the US over the period 2007-2011 there appears some justification for saying this (Federal 
Reserve, 2011). Investigating the policy’s effect under these conditions represents a valuable extension 
to the research already undertaken.  
It is postulated that the efficacy of the central bank’s purchases depends on the growth rate (equation 
5.1).  Equations 5.1-5.3 are designed to capture two correlated factors. First, very low/negative levels 
of growth induce greater financial market segmentation and/or financial distortions which reduce the 
effect of targeted asset purchases on the broad spectrum of interest rates (Blanchard, 2010; Baba et al., 
2004). Second, they capture the liquidity hoarding behaviour of financial institutions so that in a 
severe downturn they do not use the reserves provided to purchase substitute assets. Instead, they hold 
the cash for precautionary purposes (Gale and Yorulmazer, 2011). The use of one proxy is reasonable 
because these underlying behavioural and institutional variables should be strongly correlated. The 
derivation of the dynamic, log-linearised version of this equation is contained in the Appendix 
(Section H). 
ܴ௧ ൌ  ሺܴ௧ିଵሻఘೝ ቈቀ൫ܴ௧௣൯൫ܴ௧ାଵ௣ ൯൫ܴ௧ାଶ௣ ൯൫ܴ௧ାଷ௣ ൯ቁ
భ
ర ൬ 1Ωݐܧܴ௧൰
ద
቉
ଵିఘೝ
 
After log-linearisation this equation becomes: 
̂ݎ௧ ൌ  ߩ௥̂ݎ௧ିଵ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߩ௥ሻൣ0.25൫̂ݎ௧௣  ൅  ̂ݎ௧ାଵ௣ ൅  ̂ݎ௧ାଶ௣ ൅  ̂ݎ௧ାଷ௣ ൯ െ ߷൫ܧ෢ܴ ௧ ൅ Ω෡௧൯൧ 
with, 
Ω෡௧ ൌ  ߩΩΩ෡௧ ൅  Θ൫ݕොݐ െ ݕොݐെ1൯ ;  ߩΩ ൌ 0.9, Θ ൌ 0.05  
(5.1)
(5.2)
(5.3)
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The results of the various simulations that were conducted suggest that these factors do have an 
influence. They do not however generate large quantitative departures from the case that featured a 
constant effect of the central bank’s balance sheet on the target interest rate (Appendix Section B, 
Figure B.3).39  
Nevertheless, the simulations do highlight the role of a variety of factors which could lead to the 
policy either succeeding or failing. QE may induce changes in financial market participants’ 
behaviour, fundamentally altering the way specific asset markets operate, such as the bond market. An 
example would be that the central bank’s purchase of bonds and other financial assets induces a 
lengthy period of unjustified optimism about an economy’s future prospects or unjustified fear 
regarding future inflation. These would lead to asset price falls and increases in the targeted long-term 
interest rates. This thesis attempts to capture such factors with this variable factor but a more fully-
fledged derivation is beyond its scope and should be the subject of future research.  
5.2.6 Asset purchases of different maturities  
Another important question to ask regarding QE is if the central bank was only able to target 
purchases at a single maturity length, could it still use QE to stimulate output? The experiment that is 
envisaged is where consumption and investment decisions are influenced by an interest rate not 
directly targeted by policymakers through some error of judgment or institutional restriction. For 
simplicity, only three different maturity lengths were incorporated and it was assumed that real 
spending decisions were affected by the one year interest rate. The results were not sensitive to either 
of these assumptions.  
 
                                                            
39 Further simulations using different values for  Θ demonstrate that the size of these financial market effects is negatively related to the 
policy’s effectiveness. In none of the simulated cases (Θ Ԗ ሼ0.1,0.25,0.3ሽ for both a constant and variable χ did the policy generate welfare 
losses. It was also investigated if adverse changes in financial participants’ behaviour caused directly by the enlarging of the central bank 
balance sheet could result in the policy having a negative impact on welfare. This is based upon the injection of central bank liquidity 
increasing expectations regarding future inflation. Investors would therefore sell assets, anticipating falling asset prices as a consequence of 
rises in the future policy rate to combat the higher inflation. This would place upward pressure on yields and this could well overcome the 
initial policy effect, resulting in stable or higher yields. The effect was incorporated by altering equation 5.3 to ߷ො௧ ൌ  ߩద߷ො௧ ൅  Θሺݕො௧ െ ݕො௧ିଵሻ െ
Γܧ෢ܴ ௧  ;  Γ Ԗ ሼ0.05,0.1, 0.15,0.2ሽ. In all of the cases considered, the policy’s implementation still led to welfare improvements. 
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Essentially, these follow the expectations approach except that interest rate persistence is imposed to 
match the empirical evidence (Romero-Avila, 2007). An advantage of this approach is that it captures 
the stylised fact that long-term interest rates demonstrate a relatively higher level of persistence 
compared to short-term rates. 
The results are that the best maturity to target is the one which affects the consumption and investment 
decisions of agents in the economy, and this is the medium-term interest rate under the current 
assumptions.40 The reason is that asset purchases of the correct maturity leads to a proportionally 
greater decline in the interest rate which directly affects consumer choices. Importantly, even with a 
large degree of persistence in long-term interest rates, purchases of other maturities still spill over 
enough that the correct real interest rate falls, stimulating economic activity (Appendix Section C).  
The result that little change occurs whether the central bank targets either a six month, a twelve month 
or a five year rate supports two further conclusions. First, even if the Federal Reserve purchased the 
wrong assets, sufficient spill-over effects were present that the policy still yielded welfare 
improvements. Second, supposing that institutional or political factors prevent the monetary 
authorities from targeting certain assets, it can still use QE to improve welfare in a GFC-like 
downturn.  
 
 
                                                            
40 An alternative simulation was conducted where the long-term interest rate assumed to effect households’ behaviour was the 5 year interest 
rate. Purchases of the 5 year interest rate yielded the largest welfare improvements.  
(5.4)
(5.5)
(5.6)
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5.2.7 Welfare Effects of Different Policy Rules 
In light of the public releases associated with QE not revealing the precise variables the Federal 
Reserve was reacting to, the impact of QE if the central bank uses different decision rules was another 
issue to be addressed. It was therefore necessary to analyse a variety of rules for setting the size of the 
central bank balance sheet. Seven alternative rules were selected according to an assessment of what 
central banks, including the Federal Reserve, appear to be reacting to when implementing QE: 
inflation, yield spreads and the output gap. These rules are listed below (see the Appendix section I for 
the dynamic versions). The relative weights in each rule were chosen so that a combined percentage 
deviation in the target variables induced a ߢ% deviation in the size of the central bank balance sheet. 
These rules should be seen as special cases of the general rule:  
ܧܴ௧ െ ܧܴכ ൌ  ߶൫S୲, Δ ୲ܵ, Y୲ െ Y୲୤, Δ ୲ܻ, ߨ௧, ܧܴ௧൯ 
A more detailed examination of the optimal form of this rule is an issue for further research.  
 
ܧܴ௧ െ ܧܴכ ൌ  ܵכ ൬
ܵ௧
ܵכ൰
ഉ
మ ൬ ௧ܻ
௧ܻିଵ
൰
ିഉమ
 
 
ܧܴ௧ െ ܧܴכ ൌ  ܵכ ൬
ܵ௧
ܵכ൰
ഉ
మ ቆ ௧ܻ
௧ܻ
௙ቇ
ିഉమ
 
 
ܧܴ௧ െ ܧܴכ ൌ  ܵכ ቆ ௧ܻ
௧ܻ
௙ቇ
ି఑
 
 
ܧܴ௧ െ ܧܴכ ൌ  ܵכ ൬
ܵ௧
ܵ௧ିଵ൰
఑
 
 
ܧܴ௧ െ ܧܴכ ൌ  ܵכ ൬
ܵ௧
ܵ௧ିଵ൰
ഉ
మ ൬ ௧ܻ
௧ܻିଵ
൰
ିഉమ
 
 
ܧܴ௧ െ ܧܴכ ൌ  ܵכ ൬
ܵ௧
ܵכ൰
ഉ
య ቆ ௧ܻ
௧ܻ
௙ቇ
ିഉయ
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(5.7)
(5.8)
(5.9)
(5.10)
(5.11)
(5.12)
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ܧܴכ ൰
ߩݎ݌ ൬ܵ௧ܵכ൰
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Simulations using these seven different rules demonstrate that the effectiveness of QE is affected by 
the type of rule adopted. Unfortunately, no derivation of the welfare loss function using a second order 
Taylor approximation of the Smets and Wouters (2007) utility function around the model’s steady 
state has been undertaken (Debortoli et al., 2011). Given the presence of wage and price rigidities and 
the form of the utility function in the SW model, a welfare loss measure like that derived by Erceg et 
al. (2000) was used instead.41 This assumption is consistent with the literature (Bean et al., 2010; 
Chadha et al., 2009; Curdia et al., 2011; Debortoli et al., 2010). The welfare loss over twenty quarters 
was used to ascertain which decision rule yielded the greatest welfare increase over the relevant policy 
horizon. This particular technique was used because of the temporary nature of QE and the use of only 
two of the shocks in the GOZ model.  
Table 1 
 Constant Effect of Central Bank Balance Sheet
Welfare Improvements of alternative policy rules 
Policy Constant ߯ Variable ߯ 
   
External Finance Premium (EFP)(4.59) 0.246 0.231 
Output Gap and EFP(5.7) 0.285 0.228 
EFP and ΔY (5.8) 0.138 0.139 
Output Gap (5.9) 0.304 0.224 
ΔEFP(5.10) -0.003 -0.015 
ΔEFP and ΔY (5.11) 0.005 -0.015 
EFP, Output Gap and Inflation (5.12) 0.222 0.179 
EFP with lag (5.13) 0.231 0.228 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
41The functional form of the welfare loss function used was െ ଵଷ ܧ௧ ∑ ߚҧ௦ ቀ൫ݕ௧ା௦ െ ݕ௧ା௦
௙ ൯ଶ ൅ ሺߨ௧ା௦௣ ሻଶ ൅ ሺߨ௧ା௦௪ ሻଶቁଶ଴௦ୀ଴   (Erceg et al., 2000; Gali, 
2008). The results were not sensitive to alternative specifications of the welfare function which altered the weight on the output gap or added 
additional objectives such as the external finance premium based on what appears to have been the Federal Reserve’s objectives. In total, 
three other measures were employed: Measure 1 = െ ଵଶ ܧ௧ ∑ ߚҧ௦ ቀߙ൫ݕ௧ା௦ െ ݕ௧ା௦
௙ ൯ଶ ൅ ߨ௧ା௦ଶ ቁଶ଴௦ୀ଴  (Clarida et al., 1999; Ravenna and Walsh, 
2006), Measure 2 = െ ଵଷ ܧ௧ ∑ ߚҧ௦ሺሺݕ௧ା௦ሻଶ ൅ ሺߨ௧ା௦
௣ ሻଶ ൅ ൅ሺݏ௧ା௦ሻଶሻଶ଴௦ୀ଴  and Measure 3 =  െ ଵଷ ܧ௧ ∑ ߚҧ௦ ቀ൫ݕ௧ା௦ െ ݕ௧ା௦
௙ ൯ଶ ൅ ሺߨ௧ା௦௣ ሻଶ ൅ ሺ݅௧ା௦ሻଶቁଶ଴௦ୀ଴  
(Onatski and Williams, 2004; Adolfson et al., 2008). 
(5.13)
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Table 2 
Variable Effect of Central Bank Balance Sheet
Welfare Improvements of alternative policy rules 
Policy Constant ߯ Variable ߯ 
   
External Finance Premium (EFP)(4.59) 0.218 0.220 
Output Gap and EFP(5.7) 0.268 0.219 
EFP and ΔY (5.8) 0.098 0.120 
Output Gap (5.9) 0.292 0.217 
ΔEFP(5.10) -0.058 -0.048 
ΔEFP and ΔY (5.11) -0.052 -0.040 
EFP, Output Gap and Inflation (5.12) 0.197 0.166 
EFP with lag (5.13) 0.203 0.217 
   
 
As Table 1 and 2 demonstrate, the rules which contain the external finance premium and/or the output 
gap are the most effective. Essentially, these rules ensure that the central bank adopts a more 
aggressive stance to a combination of an external finance premium shock and a net worth shock, 
which implies that the deviation of output from its steady state value is lower.  
In terms of the current use of QE by the Federal Reserve, there appears little evidence that it was 
reacting to either the change in yield spreads or output growth. Consequently, these simulations 
suggest that QE has had an effect regardless of the exact policy rule used by the Federal Reserve 
between 2008-2010.42  
5.2.8 Welfare Effects of Fiscal versus Monetary Policy 
Simulations with fiscal instead of monetary policy as the active instrument were also conducted to 
provide an initial conclusion regarding which policy would be more effective in dealing with a GFC-
like financial crisis. The GOZ model contains a fiscal policy shock and this shock was used as one 
representation of a fiscal policy. It was assumed that this fiscal spending shock was financed in such a 
way that it did not affect labour supply decisions, the sustainability of the fiscal deficit or the real 
interest rate in the medium-run. While simplistic, it was thought this was a simple way of capturing 
any direct effect of fiscal stimulus. As table 3 demonstrates, fiscal policy generated similar welfare 
                                                            
42 The results of simulations using a range of different weights in the welfare objective function, including those used by Erceg et al. (2000), 
were practically identical to those reported. None of the conclusions drawn by this thesis are affected by this assumption.  
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improvements and under certain calibrations, QE was the preferred alternative. This suggests that QE 
represents a viable alternative to fiscal stimulus if the latter is not feasible because of political 
machinations and an unsustainable budget deficit.  
Table 3 
Constant Effect of Central Bank Balance Sheet
Welfare Improvements for fiscal and monetary policies 
Parameter Constant ߯ Variable ߯ 
 Fiscal Monetary Fiscal Monetary  
     
σ = 1.0188 0.236 0.246 0.125 0.231 
σ = 1.3 0.635 0.425 0.375 0.401 
σ = 2 2.047 0.913 1.435 1.065 
     
 
5.2.9 Sensitivity Testing 
To establish the credibility of the results obtained above, the sensitivity of QE’s effect was examined 
along a number of dimensions. These included: the degree of relative risk aversion of consumers 
which affects the marginal rate of inter-temporal substitution, the elasticity of the long-term interest 
rate to the size of the central bank balance sheet, the size of the signalling effect, the variability of the 
external finance premium to output innovations and the size of the portfolio rebalancing effect.  
On the whole, the results obtained in this thesis were not qualitatively sensitive to the specification of 
these and other parameters (Tables 4 and 5). Minor changes were obtained but they were not sufficient 
to negate the conclusion that QE always generates welfare improvements. 
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Table 4  
Constant Effect of Central Bank Balance Sheet
Welfare Improvements under different calibrations 
Parameter Constant ߯ Variable ߯ 
   
Base Case 0.246 0.231 
σc = 1.3 0.425 0.401 
σc = 2 0.913 1.065 
߯ = 0.04 0.364 - 
ρ୰ = 0.98 0.319 0.259 
߱ = 150 - 0.215 
߱ = 200 - 0.220 
ߩఞ= 0 - 0.220 
ߩఞ = 0.95 - 0.781 
ܴכ ൌ  ܴכ௣ ൅ 0.0025 (100 basis 
point spread) 
0.245 0.230 
ܴכ ൌ  ܴכ௣ ൅ 0.005 (200 basis point 
spread) 
0.245 0.230 
5 year interest rate 0.212 0.166 
Original parameters from GOZ43 24.429 106.522 
Re-estimated parameters 0.373 0.261 
ߝ௧௡௪ ൌ  ߳௧௡௪ ;  ߳௧௡௪ ~ ܰሺ0, ߪ௡௪ሻ 0.076 0.061 
   
 
Table 5  
Variable Effect of Central Bank Balance Sheet
Welfare Improvements under different calibrations 
Parameter Constant ߯ Variable ߯ 
   
Base Case 0.218 0.220 
σc = 1.3 0.361 0.379 
σc = 2 0.710 1.001 
߯ = 0.04 0.347 - 
ρ୰ = 0.98 0.316 0.257 
߱ = 150 - 0.216 
߱ = 200 - 0.214 
ߩఞ= 0 - 0.201 
ߩఞ = 0.95 - 0.767 
ܴכ ൌ  ܴכ௣ ൅ 0.0025 (100 basis 
point spread) 
0.218 0.220 
ܴכ ൌ  ܴכ௣ ൅ 0.005 (200 basis point 
spread) 
0.217 0.219 
5 year interest rate 0.215 0.168 
Original parameters from GOZ 23.249 106.227 
Re-estimated parameters 0.307 0.245 
ߝ௧௡௪ ൌ  ߳௧௡௪ ;  ߳௧௡௪ ~ ܰሺ0, ߪ௡௪ሻ 0.070 0.059 
   
                                                            
43 These large numbers are explained by the large persistence in the net worth shock relative to the base case.  
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Tables 6 and 7 also demonstrate that the qualitative effect of QE was not sensitive to the size of the 
shocks which demonstrates that the policy could be welfare-enhancing whether the financial crisis was 
mild or severe.  
Table 6  
Constant Effect of Central Bank Balance Sheet
Welfare Improvements with larger shocks 
Parameter Constant ߯ Variable ߯ 
   
Base Case 0.246 0.231 
Shocks with 2σshocks 0.982 0.922 
Shocks with 4σshocks 3.929 3.690 
Shocks with 5σshocks 6.139 5.765 
Shocks with 10σshocks 24.557 23.061 
Shocks with 20σshocks 98.229 92.243 
   
 
Table 7  
Variable Effect of Central Bank Balance Sheet
Welfare Improvements with larger shocks 
Parameter Constant ߯ Variable ߯ 
   
Base Case 0.218 0.220 
Shocks with 2σshocks 0.873 0.880 
Shocks with 4σshocks 3.493 2.588 
Shocks with 5σshocks 5.457 5.499 
Shocks with 10σshocks 21.830 21.996 
Shocks with 20σshocks 87.318 87.985 
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VI. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE CONDUCT OF MONETARY POLICY 
The results of the simulations conducted support two conclusions. First, that QE can generate welfare 
improvements if incorporated into the policy response to a large financial crisis. Second, that the QE 
policy implemented by the Federal Reserve since 2009 has prevented output, employment and 
investment from falling as far as it could have done. These findings support the assertions of Bernanke 
(2009) that monetary policy can remain effective even in the presence of severe stress in the financial 
system and the presence of the zero lower bound. They are also consistent with Baumeister and Benati 
(2010) and Chung et al. (2011) who find that QE has had a positive effect on output since 2009. Even 
if the signal effect of the size of the central bank balance sheet is set to zero and significant frictions 
are incorporated, QE is still able to affect economic activity. This contradicts the findings of Curdia 
and Woodford (2011) and Eggertsson and Woodford (2003), highlighting the importance of financial 
frictions.  
Another implication of the results is that there appears little downside risk to QE. Even if QE had no 
effect on nominal interest rates but resulted in higher inflation expectations, as seen in the simulations, 
then this would unambiguously reduce real interest rates and so stimulate economic activity.  
It has been argued that firms and households in a severe downturn alter their behaviour to debt 
minimisation instead of profit and utility maximisation respectively (Koo, 2009) because of a greater 
aversion to debt. This would result in the private sector reducing their debt levels despite QE ensuring 
an ample supply of funds at a very low long-term interest rate. The excessive consumption growth 
relative to income growth between 1995-2006, leaving many with high or unsustainable leverage 
ratios, certainly makes this factor plausible (Lee, 2011; Barnes and Young, 2003; Barba and Pivetti, 
2009). There is also empirical evidence of this occurring in Japan in the 1990s (Lee, 2011), during the 
1973-75 US recession (Mishkin et al., 1977), during the Great Depression (Mishkin, 1978) and in the 
current context (Fisher, 2010; Lee, 2011). However, this does not create a downside risk for QE. 
Rather, the simulation results suggest that QE may still remain effective. Alternatively, QE would be 
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effective only insofar as it enabled firms and consumers to repair their balance sheets faster by 
providing them with greater refinancing options at a lower interest rate.   
Another argument is that heightened uncertainty causes delays in consumption and investment 
decisions by risk averse agents. Bernanke (1983) and Romer (1990) have suggested that such a 
mechanism was responsible for the immediate drops in consumption and investment independent of 
interest rates seen during the Great Depression. The simulations lead to the conclusion that QE would 
still generate welfare improvements even if this was currently in play. The reason is that QE enables 
the central bank to signal its future policy movements and increases liquidity in asset markets, 
reducing uncertainty. Indeed, it would be valuable if future research examined this issue.  
A third implication of these results is that it would be beneficial for the central bank to react to yields 
spreads, exemplified by the external finance premium in the GOZ model. The postulated rule for the 
size of the central bank’s balance sheet implies the addition of the lag of the yield spread into the 
Taylor rule. Simulations with just this effect demonstrated that the central bank could bring about 
welfare improvements by doing so. The simulations show that QE can generate welfare improvements 
even in the presence of fluctuations in spreads beyond the influence of QE. However, these 
simulations are only preliminary evidence and a more detailed investigation into the source of these 
fluctuations is required before a final conclusion can be made.  
Nevertheless, a number of issues need to be considered before any general conclusion regarding QE as 
an instrument of monetary policy can be made. The first of these issues is the need to empirically 
estimate the behavioural changes discussed by Koo (2009) and Romer (1990). If they existed, one 
prediction would be that the extra liquidity provided to financial institutions by QE would simply be 
held within the banking system. There is some evidence of this based on the reserve statistics for the 
U.S. banking sector (Federal Reserve, 2011). If this was empirically established then a subsequent 
issue would be to incorporate these into the GOZ model in a more micro-founded fashion. One 
potential method could be to introduce a disutility cost for households to hold large quantities of debt 
which was dependent on consumption or output.  
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A second issue is the need to more rigorously estimate the parameters in the augmentations to the 
GOZ model. If the range of values used for the parameters was in fact too low then an increase in the 
central bank balance sheet could induce an overall rise in interest rates. This raises the corollary that 
the efficacy of QE could also depend on different economic institutions unique to a particular country. 
In these circumstances, a  recommendation for QE could not be given in quite the same way as interest 
rate setting with an explicit inflation target has been.  
A third issue is the role of external financial markets which could alter the way that the transmission 
mechanism of the policy works. In this thesis, a closed economy was assumed because of the 
ambiguous theoretical effects of QE on the exchange rate. However, there is some empirical evidence 
of a depreciation of the $U.S. immediately after QE was implemented, highlighting the importance of 
this issue for future research. This is especially so given the effect of QE is not clear.  
The impact of the zero lower bound is a further issue that must be addressed. This thesis abstracted 
from this issue because (1) the solution methods for instituting a lower bound constraint involved the 
same method as this thesis except with a manual adjustment of the resulting impulse response 
functions and (2) the impulse response functions were unchanged except that they were more 
exaggerated when the constraint bound. The addition of the factors described in the preceding 
paragraphs may alter these properties but again this is for future research.  
Another issue is whether QE alters the indeterminacy region of the GOZ model. The inclusion of a 
central bank balance sheet size equation is identical to making the central bank respond to the yield 
spread within the context of the GOZ model. However, this may induce greater instability/stability in 
inflation expectations. This would be a large drawback or another advantage of QE if present.  
A final issue is that QE does not do anything to address the ‘flawed institutions and practices of the 
current financial regime, often referred to as the New Financial Architecture (NFA)’ which is argued 
to have caused the crisis (Crotty, 2009). While outside the scope of this thesis, reforming of financial 
market regulations remains a crucial issue for the policy response to the GFC. Future research should 
certainly consider QE’s effect on the breadth and speed of such reforms.   
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VII. CONCLUSION 
This thesis contributes to the existing literature by examining the macroeconomic effects of QE in the 
U.S. context and assessing the effects of the policy adopted by the Federal Reserve. While there has 
been some research on the effect of the policy on the yields of particular assets, little conclusive 
empirical or theoretical work has been conducted on the possible effects of the policy in the presence 
of financial market imperfections. The results obtained indicate that the policy can and has raised 
welfare by significantly reducing the effects of a net worth and yield spread shock to the U.S. 
economy.  
Instituting the policy upon reaching the zero lower bound on the policy rate would not eliminate these 
welfare gains as the portfolio rebalancing channel could still operate. This is in contrast to Eggertsson 
and Woodford (2003) who assert that upon reaching the zero lower bound, the size of the central 
bank’s balance sheet becomes irrelevant if it does not credibly signal a lower policy rate in the future.  
The simulations involving QE undertaken in this thesis also demonstrate that the policy is likely to be 
a valuable instrument for a central bank in addition to a short-term interest rate. This conclusion is 
only provisional because of the need to conduct further research on especially two issues: (1) the 
variable elasticity between interest rates and the central bank balance sheet and (2) the effect of 
relaxing the closed-economy assumption.   
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VIII. APPENDIX  
 
A. Parameter Values 
Parameter Value Alternative 144 Alternative 245 
    
߯ 0.0233 0.04 0.0241 
߮ 5.1245 6.53 7.2871 
ߪ௖ 1.0188 1.10 0.9614 
ߣ 0.7781 0.79 0.8872 
ߦ௪ 0.8245 0.94 0.8047 
ߪ௟ 1.2366 2.26 1.1656 
ߦ௣ 0.8209 0.76 0.7699 
ߡ௪ 0.5286 0.23 0.5373 
ߡ௣ 0.2031 0.22 0.4374 
߰ 0.3306 0.34 0.5413 
߶௣ 1.3733 1.62 1.5045 
߰ଵ 1.7572 1.12 1.5425 
ߩ௥ 0.8339 0.73 0.7734 
߰ଶ 0.0140 0.01 0.0667 
߰ଷ 0.1635 0.11 0.1741 
ߨത 0.5826 0.65 0.6936 
100ሺߚିଵ െ 1ሻ 0.2351 0.8 0.2046 
݈ ҧ -0.2342 -1.06 -0.2372 
ߛҧ 0.3937 0.42 0.3528 
ߙ 0.0940 0.26 0.2307 
ߪ௔ 0.4763 0.41 0.4443 
ߪ௕ 0.0457 0.22 0.0966 
ߪ௚ 0.3581 0.49 0.4802 
ߪ௠ 0.1014 0.24 0.2498 
ߪ௣ 0.1089 0.14 0.1355 
ߪ௪ 0.3110 0.24 0.2734 
ߪ௙ௗ 0.0894 0.06 0.4426 
ߪ௡௪ 2.0168 0.87 1.9633 
ߩ௔ 0.9646 0.93 0.8951 
ߩ௕ 0.8351 0.22 0.6304 
ߩ௚ 0.8924 0.99 0.8819 
ߩ௥௣ 0.4485 0.22 0.2029 ߩ௣ 0.8676 0.76 0.8041 
ߠ௣ 0.7371 0.55 0.6953 
ߩ௪ 0.4820 0.91 0.8560 
ߠ௪ 0.3503 0.89 0.7705 
ߩ௙ௗ 0.8729 0.90 0.8793 
ߩ௡௪ 0.5067 0.98 0.5067 
ߩ௚௔ 0.2709 0.59 0.4984 
ߠ 0.9932 0.99 0.9932 
K/N 1.56 1.7 1.56 
߫ 0.15 0.15 0.15 
ߢ 2 2 2 
߷ 0.1 0.1 0.1 
ߩ௥ 0.85 0.85 0.85 
ߩఞ 0.8 0.8 0.8 
߱ 100 100 100 
ߩΩ 0.9 0.9 0.9 
Θ 0.25 0.25 0.25 
    
 
 
                                                            
44 Reported parameters in Gilchrist et al. (2009). 
45 Parameters estimated using an alternative external finance premium series. 
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B. Figures for impulse response functions of variables to net worth and external finance 
premium shocks.  
Figure B.1 
GOZ Model with long-term interest rate, signal effect and signal/portfolio rebalancing effect (constant χ)   
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Figure B.2 
GOZ Model with long-term interest rate, signal effect and signal/portfolio rebalancing effect (variable χ)   
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Figure B.3 
GOZ Model with long-term interest rate, signal and portfolio rebalancing effects and a variable influence of the 
central bank balance sheet 
Constant ߯ Variable ߯ 
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C. Targeting Different Maturities 
Figure C.1 
GOZ model with long-term interest rate and signal/portfolio rebalancing effects 
Constant ߯ Variable ߯ 
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D. Smets and Wouters (2007) Steady State 
The steady state of the Smets and Wouters (2007) model is set out below.  
ܴכ௞ ൌ  
1
ߚҧ െ ሺ1 െ ߜሻ ൌ  
1
ߚ ߛ
ఙ೎ െ ሺ1 െ ߜሻ 
 
ݓכ ൌ  ቆ
ߙఈሺ1 െ ߙሻሺଵିఈሻ
߶௣ሺܴכ௞ሻఈ ቇ
భ
ሺభషഀሻ
ൌ  ቆߙ
ఈሺ1 െ ߙሻሺଵିఈሻ
ሺ1 ൅ ߣ௣ሻሺܴכ௞ሻఈ ቇ
భ
ሺభషഀሻ
ൌ  ሺ1 ൅ ߣ௪ሻݓכ௛ 
 
݅
݇ ൌ  ߛ െ ሺ1 െ ߜሻ 
 
݈
݇ ൌ  ൤
1 െ ߙ
ߙ ൨
ܴכ௞
ݓכ  
 
݇
ݕ ൌ  ߶௣ ൬
݈
݇൰
ఈିଵ
 
 
݅
ݕ ൌ  
݅
݇
݇
ݕ 
 
ܿ
ݕ ൌ 1 െ ݃ െ
݅
ݕ 
 
ݖ
ݕ ൌ ܴכ
௞ ݇
ݕ 
 
ݓכ௛݈כ
ܿכ ൌ  
1
߶௪ ൤
1 െ ߙ
ߙ ൨
ݖ
ݕ
ݕ
ܿ ൌ ൌ  
1
ሺ1 ൅ ߣ௪ሻ ൤
1 െ ߙ
ߙ ൨
ݖ
ݕ
ݕ
ܿ 
The steady state of the Gilchrist et al. (2009) model is identical except that:  
 
ܴכ௞ ൌ  ൬
ܭ
ܰ൰
ఞ 1
ߚҧ െ ሺ1 െ ߜሻ ൌ  ൬
ܭ
ܰ൰
ఞ 1
ߚ ߛ
ఙ೎ െ ሺ1 െ ߜሻ 
All the other steady state equations are adjusted accordingly to reflect this new steady state return to 
capital.  
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E. Specification of shocks in Smets and Wouters (2007)  
There are 7 shocks in the SW model.  
Technology Shock 
ߝ௧௔ ൌ ሺ1 െ ߩ௔ሻߝכ௔ ൅ ߩ௔ߝ௧ିଵ௔ ൅ ߳௧௔ ;  ߳௧௔ ~ ܰሺ0, ߪ௔ሻ 
Investment-specific technology Shock 
̂ߤ௧ ൌ ൫1 െ ߩఓ൯ߤכ ൅ ߩఓ̂ߤ௧ିଵ ൅ ߳௧ఓ ;  ߳௧ఓ ~ ܰሺ0, ߪఓሻ 
Bond Return Shock 
ߝ௧௕ ൌ ሺ1 െ ߩ௕ሻߝכ௕ ൅ ߩ௕ߝ௧ିଵ௕ ൅ ߳௧௕ ;  ߳௧௕ ~ ܰሺ0, ߪ௕ሻ 
Government Spending Shock 
ො݃௧ ൌ ൫1 െ ߩ௚൯݃כ ൅ ߩ௚ ො݃௧ିଵ൅ ߩ௚௔ߝ௧௔൅ ߩ௚௔ߝ௧ିଵ௔ ൅ ߳௧௚;  ߳௧௚ ~ ܰሺ0, ߪ௚ሻ 
Monetary Policy Shock 
ߝ௧௠ ൌ  ߩ௥ߝ௧ିଵ௠ ൅ ߳௧௠;  ߳௧௠ ~ ܰሺ0, ߪ௠ሻ 
Price Mark-up Shock 
ߝ௧௣ ൌ ൫1 െ ߩ௣൯ߝכ௣ ൅ ߩ௣ߝ௧ିଵ௣ ൅ ߠ௣߳௧ିଵ௣ ൅ ߳௧௣ ;  ߳௧௣ ~ ܰሺ0, ߪ௣ሻ 
Wage Mark-up Shock 
ߝ௧௪ ൌ ሺ1 െ ߩ௪ሻߝכ௪ ൅ ߩ௪ߝ௧ିଵ௪ ൅ ߠ௪߳௧ିଵ௪ ൅ ߳௧௪ ; ߳௧௪ ~ ܰሺ0, ߪ௪ሻ 
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F. Specification of shocks in Gilchrist et al. (2009) 
There are 8 shocks in the Gilchrist et al. (2009) model. 
Technology Shock 
ߝ௧௔ ൌ  ߩ௔ߝ௧ିଵ௔ ൅ ߳௧௔ ;  ߳௧௔ ~ ܰሺ0, ߪ௔ሻ 
Bond Return Shock 
ߝ௧௕ ൌ  ߩ௕ߝ௧ିଵ௕ ൅ ߳௧௕ ;  ߳௧௕ ~ ܰሺ0, ߪ௕ሻ 
Government Spending Shock 
ො݃௧ ൌ ߩ௚ ො݃௧ିଵ ൅ ߩ௚௔߳௧௔ ൅ ߳௧௚;  ߳௧௚ ~ ܰሺ0, ߪ௚ሻ 
Monetary Policy Shock 
ߝ௧௠ ൌ  ߩ௥ߝ௧ିଵ௠ ൅ ߳௧௠;  ߳௧௠ ~ ܰሺ0, ߪ௠ሻ 
Price Mark-up Shock 
ߝ௧௣ ൌ  ߩ௣ߝ௧ିଵ௣ െ ߠ௣߳௧ିଵ௣ ൅ ߳௧௣ ;  ߳௧௣ ~ ܰሺ0, ߪ௣ሻ 
Wage Mark-up Shock 
ߝ௧௪ ൌ  ߩ௪ߝ௧ିଵ௪ െ ߠ௪߳௧ିଵ௪ ൅ ߳௧௪ ; ߳௧௪ ~ ܰሺ0, ߪ௪ሻ 
External Finance Premium Shock 
ߝ௧௙ௗ ൌ  ߩ௙ௗߝ௧ିଵ௙ௗ ൅ ߳௧௙ௗ ;  ߳௧௙ௗ ~ ܰሺ0, ߪ௙ௗሻ 
Net worth Shock 
ߝ௧௡௪ ൌ  ߩ௡௪ߝ௧ିଵ௡௪ ൅ ߳௧௡௪ ; ߳௧௡௪ ~ ܰሺ0, ߪ௡௪ሻ 
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G. Derivation of the dynamic equation for the external finance premium with a variable 
elasticity 
The external finance premium with a variable elasticity may be expressed as follows based on 
Bernanke et al. (1999).  
ܵ௧ ൌ  ൬
ܳ௧ܭ௧
௧ܰ
൰
ఞ೟
ߝ௧௙ௗ 
In the steady state, 
ܵכ ൌ  ൬
ܳכܭכ
ܰכ
൰
ఞכ
 
This implies that  
݈݋݃ ሺܵכሻ ൌ െ߯כሺlogሺ ܰכሻ െ ݈݋݃ሺܳכሻ െ log ሺܭכሻሻ 
 
Using the method proposed in Uhlig (1995) the variables may be expressed in terms of percentage 
deviations from their steady state values.  
ܵכ݁௦̂೟ ൌ  ቆ
ܳכ݁௤ො೟ܭכ݁௞෠ ೟
ܰכ݁௡ො೟ ቇ
ఞכ௘ഖෝ೟
ߝ௧௙ௗ 
ܵכ݁௦̂೟ ൌ  ൫݁௤ො೟ା௞෠ ೟ି௡ො೟൯ఞכ௘
ഖෝ೟ ൬ܳכܭכ
ܰכ
൰
ఞכ௘ഖෝ೟
ߝ௧௙ௗ 
Using the approximation that ݁ఞෝ೟  ൎ 1 ൅ ߯̂௧, 
ܵכ݁௦̂೟ ൌ  ݁ఞכሺଵାఞෝ೟ሻሺ௤ො೟ା௞෠ ೟ି௡ො೟ሻ ൬
ܳכܭכ
ܰכ
൰
ఞכሺଵାఞෝ೟ሻ
ߝ௧௙ௗ 
Since ෠ܺ௧ ෠ܻ௧ ൎ 0, this may be simplified to: 
ܵכ݁௦̂೟ ൌ  ݁ఞכሺ௤ො೟ା௞෠ ೟ି௡ො೟ሻ ൬
ܳכܭכ
ܰכ
൰
ఞכఞෝ೟
൬ܳכܭכ
ܰכ
൰
ఞכ
ߝ௧௙ௗ 
Therefore, using the steady state relationship: 
݁௦̂೟ ൌ  ݁ఞכሺ௤ො೟ା௞෠ ೟ି௡ො೟ሻ ൬ܳכܭכ
ܰכ
൰
ఞכఞෝ೟
ߝ௧௙ௗ 
Taking the natural logarithm of both sides yields the following dynamic equation: 
̂ݏ௧ ൌ  െ߯כ൫ ො݊௧ െ ݍො௧௞ െ ෠݇௧൯ െ ߯כ߯̂௧ሺlogሺ ܰכሻ െ ݈݋݃ሺܳכሻ െ log ሺܭכሻሻ  ൅ ߝ௧௙ௗ 
Using the steady state relationship, another form for this equation is: 
̂ݏ௧ ൌ  െ߯כ൫ ො݊௧ െ ݍො௧௞ െ ෠݇௧൯ ൅ ߯̂௧ሺlogሺܵכሻሻ  ൅ ߝ௧௙ௗ 
Where ݈݋݃ ሺܵכሻ ൌ log ቀ௄כேכቁ
ఞכ
 based on the definition of the external finance premium. 
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H. Derivation of the dynamic equation for interest rate with a variable effect of the central 
bank balance sheet 
ܴ௧ ൌ  ሺܴ௧ିଵሻఘೝ ቈቀ൫ܴ௧௣൯൫ܴ௧ାଵ௣ ൯൫ܴ௧ାଶ௣ ൯൫ܴ௧ାଷ௣ ൯ቁ
భ
ర ൬ 1Ω௧ܧܴ௧൰
ద
቉
ଵିఘೝ
 
In the steady state, 
ܴכ ൌ  ሺܴכሻఘೝ ቈቀ൫ܴכ௣൯൫ܴכ௣൯൫ܴכ௣൯൫ܴכ௣൯ቁ
భ
ర ൬ 1Ωכܧܴכ൰
ద
቉
ଵିఘೝ
 
ܴכ ൌ  ൫ܴכ௣൯ ൬
1
Ωכܧܴכ൰
ద
 
Using the method in Uhlig (1995), we can express the original equation in terms of deviations from 
this steady state: 
ܴכ݁௥̂೟ ൌ  ൫ܴכ݁௥̂೟షభ൯ఘೝ ൥൬ቀܴכ௣݁௥̂೟
೛ቁ ቀܴכ௣݁௥̂೟శభ
೛ ቁ ቀܴכ௣݁௥̂೟శమ
೛ ቁ ቀܴכ௣݁௥̂೟శయ
೛ ቁ൰
భ
ర ቆ 1Ωכ݁Ω෡೟ܧܴכ݁ாோ෢ ೟
ቇ
ద
൩
ଵିఘೝ
 
ܴכ݁௥̂೟ ൌ  ൫݁ఘೝ௥̂೟షభ൯ሺܴכሻఘೝ൫ܴכ௣൯ଵିఘೝ ቆ
1
Ωכܧܴכ
ቇ
దሺଵିఘೝሻ
ቂ݁଴.ଶହ൫௥̂೟೛ ା ௥̂೟శభ೛ ା ௥̂೟శమ೛ ା ௥̂೟శయ೛ ൯൫݁ିదாோ෢ ೟൯൫݁ିదΩ෡೟൯ቃଵିఘೝ 
Using the steady state relationship, 
݁௥̂೟ ൌ  ൫݁ఘೝ௥̂೟షభ൯ ቂ݁଴.ଶହ൫௥̂೟೛ ା ௥̂೟శభ೛ ା ௥̂೟శమ೛ ା ௥̂೟శయ೛ ൯൫݁ିదாோ෢ ೟൯൫݁ିదΩ෡೟൯ቃଵିఘೝ 
Using the fact that ݁௫ො೟  ൎ 1 ൅  ݔො௧ and ݔො௧ݕො௧ ൎ 0 this can be simplified to: 
̂ݎ௧ ൌ  ߩ௥̂ݎ௧ିଵ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߩ௥ሻൣ0.25൫̂ݎ௧௣  ൅ ̂ݎ௧ାଵ௣ ൅ ̂ݎ௧ାଶ௣ ൅ ̂ݎ௧ାଷ௣ ൯ െ ߷൫ܧ෢ܴ ௧ ൅ Ω෡௧൯൧ 
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I. Log-linearised, dynamic versions of different monetary policy decision rules 
ܧ෢ܴ ௧ ൌ  ቀ
ߢ
2ቁ ൬
Sכ
ܧܴכ൰ ሺ̂ݏ௧ െ ሺݕො௧ െ ݕො௧ିଵሻሻ 
ܧ෢ܴ ௧ ൌ   ቀ
ߢ
2ቁ ൬
Sכ
ܧܴכ൰ ሺ̂ݏ௧ െ ሺݕො௧ െ ݕො௧
௙ሻሻ 
ܧ෢ܴ ௧ ൌ  െ ൬
Sכ
ܧܴכ൰ ߢሺݕො௧ െ ݕො௧
௙ሻ 
ܧ෢ܴ ௧ ൌ  ൬
Sכ
ܧܴכ൰ ߢሺ̂ݏ௧ െ ̂ݏ௧ିଵሻ 
ܧ෢ܴ ௧ ൌ   ቀ
ߢ
2ቁ ൬
Sכ
ܧܴכ൰ ሺሺ̂ݏ௧ െ ̂ݏ௧ିଵሻ െ ሺݕො௧ െ ݕො௧
௙ሻሻ 
ܧ෢ܴ ௧ ൌ  ቀ
ߢ
3ቁ ൬
Sכ
ܧܴכ൰ ሺሺ̂ݏ௧ െ ൫ݕො௧ െ ݕො௧
௙൯  െ ߨො௧ሻ 
ܧ෢ܴ ௧ ൌ ߩݎ݌ܧ෢ܴ ௧ିଵ ൅ ߢ൫1 െ ߩݎ݌൯ ൬
Sכ
ܧܴכ൰ ̂ݏ௧ 
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J. Alternative formulation with separated portfolio-rebalancing and risk premia 
The original formulation was: 
ܴ௧ ൌ  ሺܴ௧ିଵሻఘೝ ቈቀ൫ܴ௧௣൯൫ܴ௧ାଵ௣ ൯൫ܴ௧ାଶ௣ ൯൫ܴ௧ାଷ௣ ൯ቁ
భ
ర ൬ 1ܧܴ௧൰
ద
቉
ଵିఘೝ
 
After log-linearisation following the method proposed by Uhlig (1995): 
̂ݎ௧ ൌ  ߩ௥̂ݎ௧ିଵ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߩ௥ሻ ൬
1
4 ൫̂ݎ௧
௣ ൅ ̂ݎ௧ାଵ௣ ൅ ̂ݎ௧ାଶ௣ ൅ ̂ݎ௧ାଷ௣ ൯ െ  ߷ܧ෢ܴ ௧൰ 
The long-term nominal interest rate could alternative be formulated as follows with ߴ௧ோ௉ and 
ߴ௧௉ோ஻reflecting the influence of the risk premium and investor portfolio preferences on the interest rate 
respectively: 
ܴ௧ ൌ  ሺܴ௧ିଵሻఘೝ ቈቀ൫ܴ௧௣൯൫ܴ௧ାଵ௣ ൯൫ܴ௧ାଶ௣ ൯൫ܴ௧ାଷ௣ ൯ቁ
భ
ర ሺߴ௧ோ௉ሻఝభሺߴ௧௉ோ஻ሻఝమ቉
ଵିఘೝ
 
After log-linearisation this yields: 
̂ݎ௧ ൌ  ߩ௥̂ݎ௧ିଵ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߩ௥ሻ ൬
1
4 ൫̂ݎ௧
௣ ൅ ̂ݎ௧ାଵ௣ ൅ ̂ݎ௧ାଶ௣ ൅ ̂ݎ௧ାଷ௣ ൯ ൅ ߮ଵ መߴ௧ோ௉ ൅ ߮ଶ መߴ௧௉ோ஻൰ 
Now supposing that the central bank balance sheet affects the risk premium and the portfolio 
rebalancing variable in the following way one can see that the original formulation can be obtained by 
simply redefining variables.  
ߴ௧ோ௉ ൌ  ߤଵ ൅  ߱ܧܴ௧ 
መߴ௧ோ௉ ൌ  ߱ܧ෢ܴ ௧ 
ߴ௧௉ோ஻ ൌ  ߤଶ ൅  ߰ܧܴ௧ 
መߴ௧௉ோ஻ ൌ   ߰ܧ෢ܴ ௧ 
Using these equations one derives the relationship that: 
߷ ൌ  ߮ଵ߱ ൅ ߮ଶ߰ 
The separation of the two effects does little for ascertaining the influence of the policy on US 
macroeconomic variables or the effectiveness of QE in general and hence the simplified version is 
utilised.  
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K. Derivation of Q equation for Smets and Wouters (2007) and Gilchrist et al. (2009) 
The optimality condition for capital accumulation in Smets and Wouters (2007) is given by: 
Ξ௧௞ ൌ  ߚܧ௧ ൥Ξ௧ାଵ ൭
ܴ௧ାଵ௞
௧ܲାଵ
ݑ௧ାଵ െ  ܽሺݑ௧ାଵሻ൱ ൅ Ξ௧ାଵ௞ ሺ1 െ ߜሻ൩ 
Dividing both sides by Ξ௧, re-arranging, dividing through by the stochastic growth rate ሺߛ௧ఙ೎ሻ and 
defining ܳ௧ ൌ  ஆ೟
ೖ
ஆ೟ , ߚҧ ൌ  
ఉ
ఊ഑೎ and ξ୲ ൌ Ξ௧ߛ௧ఙ೎yields: 
ܳ௧ ൌ  ܧ௧ ൤ߚҧ ൬
ξ୲ାଵ
ξ୲ ൰ ቀܳ௧ାଵሺ1 െ ߜሻ ൅ ݑ௧ାଵݎ௧ାଵ
௞ െ ܽሺݑ௧ାଵሻቁ൨ 
Dividing both sides by ቀஞ౪శ౩ஞ౪ ቁ yields: 
ܧ௧ ൬
ܳ௧ξ୲
ξ୲ାଵ൰ ൌ  ܧ௧ ቂߚ
ҧ ቀܳ௧ାଵሺ1 െ ߜሻ ൅ ݑ௧ାଵݎ௧ାଵ௞ െ ܽሺݑ௧ାଵሻቁቃ 
This can be re-expressed as: 
ܧ௧ ቆ݁୪୬ ൬
ೂ೟ಖ౪
ಖ౪శభ൰ቇ ൌ  ߚҧ ܧ௧ ቈቆ݁୪୬ ሺொ೟శభሻሺ1 െ ߜሻ ൅ ݁୪୬ ቀ௥೟శభ
ೖ ቁݑ௧ାଵ െ ܽሺݑ௧ାଵሻቇ቉ 
The second last equation implies that as ܳכ ൌ ݑכ ൌ 1 and ܽሺݑכሻ ൌ 0, in the steady state: 
1 ൌ  ൣߚҧ൫ሺ1 െ ߜሻ ൅ ݎכ௞൯൧ 
To derive out the final equation, it is necessary to use a first order taylor expansion on both sides 
around the zero inflation steady state. 
Let ݂ሺlnሺݍ௧ሻ , lnሺξ୲ାଵሻ , lnሺξ୲ሻሻ ൌ  ቆ݁୪୬ ൬
ೂ೟ಖ౪
ಖ౪శభ൰ቇ 
݂ሺlnሺݍ௧ሻ , lnሺξ୲ାଵሻ , lnሺξ୲ሻሻ
ൎ  ݂ሺlnሺݍכሻ , lnሺξכሻ , lnሺξכሻሻ
൅  ݂Ԣሺlnሺݍכሻ , lnሺξכሻ , lnሺξכሻሻ൫ሺlnሺݍ௧ሻ െ lnሺݍכሻሻ ൅ ሺlnሺξ୲ାଵሻ െ lnሺξכሻሻ ൅ ሺlnሺξ୲ሻ െ lnሺξכሻሻ൯ 
Now, ݂ሺݍכ, lnሺξכሻ , lnሺξכሻሻ ൌ  ݂ᇱሺ௤כ,୪୬ሺஞכሻ,୪୬ሺஞכሻሻ ൌ 1 by definition so: 
LHS = ܧ௧ ሺ1 ൅ ݍො௧ െ ξመ୲ାଵ ൅ ξመ୲ሻ where ݔො௧ is the log-deviation of variable x from its steady state value. 
Let ݃ሺlnሺݍ௧ାଵሻ , ݈nሺܳ௧ାଵሻ, lnሺݎ௧ାଵ௞ ሻ , ݑ௧ାଵሻ ൌ ቆ݁୪୬ ሺொ೟శభሻሺ1 െ ߜሻ ൅ ݁୪୬ ቀ௥೟శభ
ೖ ቁݑ௧ାଵ െ ܽሺݑ௧ାଵሻቇ 
݃ሺlnሺݍ௧ାଵሻ , lnሺݎ௧ାଵ௞ ሻ , ݑ௧ାଵሻ
ൎ  ݃ሺlnሺݍכሻ , lnሺݎכ௞ሻ , ݑכሻ ൅ ݃Ԣଵሺlnሺݍכሻ , lnሺݎכ௞ሻ , ݑכሻሺlnሺݍ௧ାଵሻ െ lnሺݍכሻሻ
൅ ݃Ԣଶሺlnሺݍכሻ , lnሺݎכ௞ሻ , ݑכሻሺlnሺݎ௧ାଵ௞ ሻ െ lnሺݎכ௞ሻሻ ൅ ݃Ԣଷሺlnሺݍכሻ , lnሺݎכ௞ሻ , ݑכሻሺݑ௧ାଵ െ ݑכሻ 
Now, using the definition of g: 
݃ᇱଵሺlnሺݍכሻ , ݈nሺܳכሻ, lnሺݎכ௞ሻ , ݑכሻ ൌ  ሺ1 െ ߜሻ 
݃Ԣଶሺlnሺݍכሻ , lnሺݎכ௞ሻ , ݑכሻ ൌ  ݁୪୬൫௥כೖ൯ ൌ  ݎכ௞ 
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݃Ԣଷሺlnሺݍכሻ , lnሺݎכ௞ሻ , ݑכሻ ൌ  ݎכ௞ െ ܽᇱሺݑכሻ ൌ  0   
 
where the last equality is obtained by equation 4.10. 
 
Also, in the steady state,  
݃ሺlnሺݍכሻ , lnሺݎכ௞ሻ , ݑכሻ ൌ  ߚҧ ቀܳכሺ1 െ ߜሻ ൅ ݑכݎ௧ାଵ௞ െ ܽሺݑכሻቁ ൌ 1 
So, 
ܴܪܵ ൌ  ݃ሺlnሺݍ௧ାଵሻ , lnሺݎ௧ାଵ௞ ሻ , ݑ௧ାଵሻ ൎ 1 ൅ ݎכ௞̂ݎ௧ାଵ௞ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߜሻݍො௧ାଵ  
Hence, 
ܧ௧ ሺݍො௧ െ ξመ୲ାଵ ൅ ξመ୲ሻ ൌ ߚҧܧ௧ ሺݎכ௞̂ݎ௧ାଵ௞ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߜሻݍො௧ାଵሻ 
which implies, using the definition of ߚҧ from the steady state relationship: 
 ݍො௧ ൌ ܧ௧ሺξመ୲ାଵሻ െ ξመ୲ ൅
ݎכ௞
ሺ1 െ ߜሻ ൅ ݎכ௞ ܧ௧ ሺ̂ݎ௧ାଵ
௞ ሻ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߜሻሺ1 െ ߜሻ ൅ ݎכ௞ ݍො௧ାଵ 
We must now use the Euler equation for households to get an expression for ܧ௧ሺξመ୲ାଵሻ െ ξመ୲. 
Dividing both sides of equation 4.7 through by the stochastic growth trend yields: 
ξ୲ ൌ  ߚҧߝ௧௕ܴ௧ܧ௧ ൤
ξ୲ାଵ
ߨ௧ାଵ൨ 
Log-linearising this using the same first order taylor expansion technique results in: 
ܧ௧ሺξመ୲ାଵሻ െ ξመ୲ ൌ  െሺ ෠ܴ௧ െ ܧ௧ሺߨො௧ାଵሻሻ 
Substituting this back into the Q equation yields its final form. 
The presence of an external finance premium generates a wedge between the long-term interest rate 
(which is effectively the policy rate) and private capital (Drautzburg and Uhlig, 2011).  
With an external finance premium as in Gilchrist et al. (2009), the optimality condition becomes: 
ܳ௧ ൌ  ܧ௧ ቈ
ߚ
ܵ௧
ഥ
൬ξ୲ାଵξ୲ ൰ ቀܳ௧ାଵሺ1 െ ߜሻ ൅ ݑ௧ାଵݎ௧ାଵ
௞ െ ܽሺݑ௧ାଵሻቁ቉ 
This implies in the steady state that  
1 ൌ  ቈ ߚ
ҧ
ܵכ ൫ሺ1 െ ߜሻ ൅ ݎכ
௞൯቉ 
Applying the same first order Taylor expansion technique as before yields 
ܧ௧ ሺݍො௧ ൅ ̂ݏ௧ െ ξመ୲ାଵ ൅ ξመ୲ሻ ൌ
ߚҧ
ܵכ ܧ௧ ሺݎכ
௞̂ݎ௧ାଵ௞ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߜሻݍො௧ାଵሻ 
Substituting in the log-linearised Euler equation yields equation 4.50, remembering that profit 
maximisation by intermediate producers implies that ̂ݎ௧ାଵ௞ ൌ ݉݌෣݇௧ାଵ௞  and the new steady state 
relationship. 
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